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Unemployment has been rising in South Africa for the last three decades, leading to 
official unemployment rates of 26.4% (37% if the broad definition is used). This implies 
a jobless total of 7 million, with more than 40% of the rural population unemployed, and 
the development of a growing pool of workers who are excluded from the labour market. 
The South African economy is facing labour market failure, with labour supply 
increasingly outstripping demand. If the economy continues on its current growth path 
this problem of labour market failure will intensifY and the employment situation will 
continue to deteriorate. The severe levels of unemployment resulting from this market 
failure are a particular problem in South Africa given the role unemployment plays in 
exacerbating poverty and inequality in an already highly unequal and segmented society, 
and the uneven incidence of unemployment among racial groups. 
Public works programming offers a response to both poverty and unemployment, while 
also addressing the linked national priority issue of asset creation. This paper discusses 
the option of state intervention through public works, reviewing the South African 
response in the context of global public works experience. The paper examines both 
project based public works programming, which forms the dominant policy response in 
South Africa, and the option of large-scale labour intensification of state expenditure, and 
examines the employment creation and cost implications of each, drawing on a case study 
from KwaZulu Natal. The paper concludes that public works interventions in South 
Africa to date have been relatively limited in scope and impact, and that the potential 
exists for far greater job creation and poverty alleviation through both the labour 
intensification of public spending, and the rationalization of the project based approach. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Problem 
Unemployment has been rising in South Africa for the last three decades (Lewis 2001), 
leading to official unemployment rates of 26.4%, or 37% if the broad definition is used l , 
implying a jobless total of 7 million, with more than 40% of the rural population 
unemployed, and the development of a growing pool of workers who are excluded from 
the labour market (Stats SA 2001). The South African economy is facing labour market 
failure, with labour supply increasingly outstripping demand. If the economy continues 
on its current growth path this problem of labour market failure will worsen and the 
employment situation will continue to deteriorate. The severe levels of unemployment 
resulting from this market failure are a particular problem in South Africa given the role 
unemployment plays in exacerbating poverty and inequality in an already highly unequal 
and segmented society, and the uneven incidence of unemployment among racial groups 
(Leibbrandt and Woolard 2001). 
This dissertation explores the relationship between unemployment and poverty in South 
Africa, and discusses the option of state intervention to address these twin challenges. 
The main policy instrument examined is public works programming, which offers a 
response to both poverty and unemployment, while also addressing the linked national 
priority issue of asset creation. The paper first outlines the problem of unemployment in 
the context of South Africa and its linkages with poverty and inequality, and then 
examines the characteristics and incidence of unemployment, before going on to consider 
the causes of unemployment and its skewed distribution. Next the paper considers policy 
options in response to the rising unemployment trend, focusing on public works, and sets 
out an analytical framework for public works programme design, drawing on 
international experience. A South African case study is then discussed, and its 
performance assessed in comparison to national and international experience, using the 
1 The broad defi1lition of unemployment includes economically active people who are actively seeking work as 
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conventional methodology for appraising public works programming performance2. The 
incompleteness of this analytical approach is discussed, and complementary approaches 
entailing i) the relative costing of labour and capital intensive programming and ii) an 
assessment of the welfare impact of programming are outlined. The implications for 
South African policy development are then discussed in the light of this analysis, together 
with programming recommendations, which conclude that large scale public works 
programming is an appropriate response to the massive labour market failure which the 
country is currently experiencing. 
The Role of the Labour Market in Poverty and Inequality 
The unammous insight of recent poverty analyses based on a range of indicators, 
encompassing the conventional income and expenditure indices (May 2000, Leibbrandt 
and Woolard 2001) or deprivation indices incorporating a broader entitlement approach 
(McIntyre et al 2000), is that poverty, however defined, is a growing problem in South 
Africa, along with inequality (Bhorat et al 2001). 
Out of a total population of 45 million, 24 million South Africans live under the poverty 
line3 (Stats SA 2000). 13 million live in destitution, with income levels less than half the 
poverty line (Samson et al 2002), and one in four children under the age of six, a total of 
l.5 million children, are stunted due to chronic malnutrition (Mgijima 1999). These 
poverty levels are closely correlated with unemployment; the poorest face unemployment 
rates of more than 70% (Samson et al 2002) and the majority of households in the bottom 
four income deciles have no members in employment, leading to the conclusion that most 
poor households are poor due to the absence of wage income (Nattrass and Seekings 
2001), findings which are confirmed by survey work indicating that job creation is the 
priority demand of households on the state, in terms of improving welfare levels (Klasen 
1997, Clark 2000). Given the strong correlation between wage income and poverty in 
2 This framework was developed by Ravallion (1998) for the World Bank. 
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South Afiica, responding to unemployment is clearly a key policy challenge, in terms of 
addressing the crisis of poverty and uneven development currently facing the country. 
Leibbrandt and Woolard (2001) formally decompose the linkage between the labour 
market and household inequality in order to explore the impact of socio-economic 
differences on position in the labour market and the incidence of poverty in South Afiica 
in more detail4 . TheIr conclusion is that access to employment is critical, since wage 
income accruing to households through wage labour or remittances, is the primary cause 
of income inequality. This argument is illustrated in table 1 below, which indicates that 
shocks relating to wage income account for more than 80% of household mobility into 
poverty (see shaded segment of the table) . This mobility profiling highlights the 
importance of labour market changes in influencing the movement of households across 
the poverty line. 
Table 1: Causes of Household Mobility (%) 
Cause of mobility Into Poverty Out of Poverty 
: :f~l :mi ~on~y : i~oollle: 'as :~: Q(:;:: i::: :::: ~ )\ii: ["[["r::: t: :.j :: [[\:::: ::~::: t~~:::: ... : :.::::: ... _. ...... ~ . ~\~. ~~~ ~ . ~~~~~~~~~ ~~ ~i :~ ::: :: 
d¢mogrnprucevents· .......••...••• •• ••• •.. ••.•.•..••••..• .•• ••••. •••. . · . · ·. ·· 27 ~ .i . · · •••• ••• ••••••• • ••• •• •••••• • : 233·.. ......../ n· .......... ...... .. . .. . . . .................... .... .. . -.. ::: :::: ::::.:"::.: ::: ::::::::::::: :::: :::: ::: :: :: :: :: :::: :::::::::: ::.:":":"::: : ::' ::::: :: T:(!i<~' 
) ~~1:6:;i=: in · in~ fj-°ril • •• •• • ·••••••• ... 2tCF.. .. :.:..i: 193< ............. 1 .•...•.••••• •...•••••.. 
·.·.·~~"11.ou~~hOldmember liihollI ••• .. ..• •. ...•••••• ••• ••...•.. ••••. ..• .•••••• .. .. . ..:; ••••..•.•••••••••••• •• •••••••••••••••••••••.•.•.••• : .? ............. .. .. .... . . ...... .. . "' ... .. .. ... .. _ .. "... .. ... .. ...... .. . . ................ .. :::"::: :::::: :::.:.:: ::.:::":: <.H.[-:. :l·/i./ :l:r::: :::::: :::: .. ·· 
~gs .... · ··i /H H ..... :. 2.t1;7 !...... . .. .. ft',o / ... .... ..... ........ ....... .. .... ... . 
Re~s . •·• •• •• ·.·· ···.···..T WA . ....... }J;:Z i./!·i ...... ···· ··· 
Non-labour income ofheadlspouse 5.9 6.7 
Non labour income of other household 
Members 1.5 2.9 
Self-employment income 4.4 8.8 
Farm income 5.9 3.4 
Source: Lelbbrandt and Woolard 2001 
Given the rising level of unemployment and the strength of its correlation with poverty, 
the negative impact of rising unemployment potentially counterbalances the positive 
impact on inequality of the decline in racial discrimination in the labour market 
(Leibbrandt and Woolard 2001 , p675), a critical concern in a society which is already one 
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Carter and May (2001) argue that falling shares of income are accruing to the bottom 
deciles, implying that this group of households is getting poorer and inequality 
increasing. Viewing poverty from a dynamic perspective, they argue that the poorest 
households are subject to ongoing labour market exclusion and economic marginalisation 
over time, which compounds and perpetuates their poverty. The chronically poor 
constitute a core within this group who over time remain below the economic threshold at 
which assets can be accumulated, shocks absorbed and expenditure smoothed, and hence 
are unable to acquire the human capital required for participation in the labour market or 
move out of poverty. 
The critical factor compounding this dynamic poverty trap for the chronically poor is the 
contraction of formal sector unskilled labour demand in South Africa during the last three 
decades5. Given the unusually high dependence on formal sector income in South Africa, 
in contrast to the more typical African pattern with a greater degree of dependence on the 
informal sector or subsistence agricultural activity, the fall in formal sector demand for 
unskilled labour has particularly serious poverty and equity consequences. 
The Costs of Unemployment 
Having considered the income effects of unemployment on poverty and inequality, it is 
necessary to unpick the implications of unemployment in terms of its social and 
economic cost. 
The socio-economic costs of unemployment have been examined in some detail, although 
primarily within a developed country context. Unemployment has been found to have 
negative social impacts at both individual and household level, the most significant being 
4 Liebbrandt and Woolard's dynamic poverty analysis is based on panel data for KwaZulu Natal, drawn from 
the 1993 SALDRU Living Standards Measurement Survey and the 1998 KwaZulu Natal Income Distribution 
Survey. 
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reduced physical and mental health status, increased social isolation, and reduced take up 
of education and health services (Leon and Walt 2001), as well as the more immediate 
impacts attributable directly to poverty. These effects lead to an increase in domestic and 
social conflict, political disaffection and criminal activity, and the undermining of social 
stability. These findings were mirrored in a recent study in the townships around Durban, 
which found similar correlations between unemployment and social breakdown, in terms 
of violence and antisocial behaviour (Louw and Shaw 1997). 
The exclusion of almost 40% of the population from the labour market may also have 
profound political costs. Given current trends the unemployed are likely to comprise the 
majority of the workforce within the next decade (Lewis 2001a), implying that more than 
half of the economically active the population will not be participating in the national 
economy, and will form a residual 'surplus' group in a highly polarised economy. The 
cost of such polarisation is likely to be negative in terms of medium term political and 
social stability, and consequently the resolution of this problem poses not only a major 
ethical challenge to the state, but also a challenge of political survival. 
Having reviewed the social and political costs of unemployment, it is necessary to 
consider the macroeconomic implications. From a conventional macroeconOffilC 
perspective the constrained consumer demand resulting from high levels of 
unemployment acts as a break on national economic growth6. The limited consumer 
market reduces the attractiveness of South Africa in terms of both domestic and 
international investment. Growing unemployment and inequality also deters investment 
sui generis, by raising investor concerns regarding actual and potential social and 
economic instability (Gelb 2001). Subbarao et al (1996) also highlight the this aspect of 
the negative economic impact of unemployment, arguing that the foregone cost of not 
accounting for the poor may compromise economic growth in the long-run. This 
argument indicates the negative investment implications for an economy in which the 
poor resort to criminal or marginalised activities in order to survive, due to the lack of 
6 The potential negati"e and contractionary macroeconomic implications of unemployment and constrained 
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formal (or informal) sector employment. This lack of confidence in the stability of the 
country has a significant deterrent effect on Foreign Direct Investment in South Africa 
(BusinessMap 2001), which in 2001 averaged less than 1 % of GDP, substantially below 
the rates of between 3 and 5% enjoyed in comparable emerging markets in Europe, 
despite the stability of South Africa's macro-economic (rather than social) indicators 7. 
An additional macroeconomic cost arising from unemployment is the cost of revenue 
forgone, in terms of under-utilised productive capacity, in line with the traditional neo-
classical growth model which characterised surplus labour as an opportunity for 
accumulation and growth (Lewis 1955). Foregone production and revenue projections 
for South Africa are not available however, and so it is not possible to quantifY this 
aspect of the macroeconomic impact of unemployment. 
While the various consequences of unemployment are not easily quantified in economic 
terms, it is evident that unemployment has severe and mutually reinforcing implications 
in the social, political and economic spheres, which combine to worsen poverty and 
inequality, depress economic growth prospects, and pose a serious threat to national 
stability. 
7 A recent EIU survey, World Investment Prospects, (March 2001) forecast that South Africa would receive 0.2% of 
global FDI flows ($10bn) during the period 2001-5, while Poland and Brazil, frequently used Middle Income 
Country comparators for South Mrica, would be likely to receive 0.8% and 2.1 % respectively, highlighting the 
mvestment deficit affecting the economy. Since levels of inequality in Brazil are comparable to those of South 
Africa, (both have Gini coefficients of approximately 0.6), this forecast implies that inequality alone may not be 
deterring investment in South Africa, but inequality in the context of a growing unemployment crisis in the 
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Chapter 2: The Characteristics of Unemployment in South Africa 
Compared to global unemployment levels, South Africa is facing an extreme 
unemployment situation, with levels significantly in excess of those found in other 
developing and developed countries. The developed country average was 6.2% in 2000, 
while the Latin American and Caribbean average was 8.9%, Asia and the Pacific 4.6%, 
and the Transition Economies 10.9% (ILO 2001a). With specific reference to other 
developing and Middle Income Countries, South Africa is also an outlier, having 
unemployment rates which are only comparable to states engaged in or emerging from 
conflict, or facing extreme economic isolation8. Brazil, which is frequently cited as an 
economic comparator for South Africa, enjoying similar levels of both GDP output and 
inequality, differs significantly from South Africa with respect to unemployment, with an 
unemployment rate of 9% in 1999 (ILO 2001 b). 
Unemployment rates are higher in the southern Africa regIOn m general than other 
regions, but even within this grouping South Africa represents an extreme, only 
outstripped by the outlier Lesotho, a weak economy which is itself highly dependent on 
the South African labour market, see table 2. 
T bl 2 S h Af' a e : out ern ncan v nemployment R ates 






•• SOlllliAfrica ....... ~ .......... .. ...... .. . • •• • ..... ... . .. ... .. . 
** 1996 *** 1997 
Source: World Employment Report 2001. fLO 
8 Algeria and the fonner Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are examples of the former category, while the latter 
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The impact of such e)(~reme levels of unemployment is particularly acute in South Africa, 
given the high dependence on the formal sector, the critical role of formal wage labour in 
driving poverty and inequality, and also the skewed distribution of unemployment among 
different demographic segments of the population. The aggregate unemployment 
statistics may be decomposed by province, gender, urban/non-urban location and race, in 
order to explore the distribution of unemployment among these segments in more detail. 
The Provincial Decomposition of Unemployment 
Provincial unemployment rates vary considerably, with a concentration of unemployment 
in North West Province, the Limpopo, and the Eastern Cape, see table 3. The Limpopo 
has a narrow unemployment rate of 30% and a broad rate of 48.7%, the highest in the 
country, and the large interval between these two figures implies that a high proportion of 
those currently withot.t work are not engaged in job search. The high value attributed to 
wage labour by households in South Africa (Adato et al 1999, Clark 2000) and the 
importance of wage income for household welfare, render it unlikely that lack of job 
search implies lack of desire to participate in the job market, but rather implies a rational 
response to a situation of chronic labour demand deficit, and the existence of a category 
of the unemployed who may be characterised as 'discouraged', and who are excluded 
within the narrow definition. On the basis of this analysis an association may be made 
between lack of job search and unavailability of work9, and the interval between the 
narrow and broad rates (B-N) used as a crude proxy for employment availability, with a 
higher figure indicating lower levels of availability 10 . A provincial 'employment 
availability ranking' may be calculated on the basis of this interval, see table 3. With the 
exception of the Free State II , poverty is concentrated in the provinces with the highest 
unemployment, illustr.'ited by the shaded cells in table 3. Again, excepting the Free State, 
9 See Nattrass 2001 for a fuller discussion of 'discouraged' workers in South Africa. 
10 For a more accurate index differential urban/non-urban participation rates would need to be taken into 
account 
11 In the Free State the high aggregate poverty level does not correspond with a matching aggregate 
unemployment level. This is largely due to the extreme depth of poverty experienced in the pockets of the 
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a high B-N interval occurs where levels of both narrow and broad unemployment are 
high, implying reduced job search activity due to chronic labour demand deficit in these 
areas. 
























A decomposition of unemployment data by gender indicates that women face higher levels of 
unemployment than men, see table 4. Ifurbanlnon urban location is added to the analysis, female 
unemployment outstrips male in both categories, a finding which has negative welfare 
implications, given the high proportion of female headed households in South Africa. Table 4 
also indicates that while narrow non-urban unemployment rates are similar to urban rates, broad 
unemployment in non-urban areas is approximately ten percentage points higher. This implies 
that in rural areas employment is generally less available, and hence job search activity is reduced 
accordingly, indicating that narrow employment statistics are likely to understate the true extent 
of non-urban unemployment. Since the broad definition of unemployment accommodates the 
U Calculated on the basis of B-N 










deterrent impact of chronic work unavailability on job search, it is the most sensitive indicator of 
non-urban unemployment, and the most relevant for estimating the incidence of unemployment in 
South Africa, and as such the broad definition will be used as the basis for further discussion 141 . 
T bl i U a e : . S th At: . b L nemployment ID ou rica, y ocatlOn an d G d en er 
Narrow Broad 
Total Male Female Total Male Female 
Total 26.4 24.8 28 37 33 .1 41 
Urban 26.2 24.1 28.6 33 .5 29.5 37.8 
Non-urban 26.7 26.4 26.9 43:; -"""";""-::; '-~~"';;~"""t:&:<"ij;;,~-.,;~:-_· __ 
<~-" -',-;:-" -~-: :Z.>;'.-"-H"?'-~'-·'·--:\': ?;:-
Source: Labour Force Survey, February 2001, Stats SA 
Race however is a more significant determinant of the incidence of unemployment than gender 
and urban/non-urban location, due in large part to the legacy of racial employment restrictions 
under the apartheid regi me. Table 5 illustrates the continued racial segmentation of 
unemployment, together with the impacts of location and gender. Africans experience the highest 
rates of unemployment in all scenarios, with an average of 42.9%, compared to 30.3% for 
Coloureds, 22 .5% for Indians and Asians, and 10.1 % for Whites. Unemployment is high in all 
racial categories, but the level experienced by Africans is severe, and has been described as 
' catastrophic' by Kingdon and Knight (2001, p13). The decomposition of racial unemployment 
by gender reveals that fema le unemployment across all racial categories is higher than male, see 







Figure 1: Broad Unemployment by 
Race and Gender (%) 
Source: Labour Force Survey, February 2001 , Stats SA 
1:1 Male 
• Female 
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If urban/non-urban location and race are taken into consideration, non-urban African 
employment levels are the highest at 44.9%, (see shaded figures in table 5 below). When 
decomposition by gender is included in the analysis the group enduring highest incidence 
of unemployment is non-urban female Africans, for whom the unemployment rates is 
47.2%. From this the conclusion may be drawn that involuntary unemployment is 
concentrated in the fe:nale rural black population. 
Table 5: Broad Unem 
















































* Sample size too small for reliable estimates 
















Age is also closely correlated with unemployment, with 70% of the unemployed in the 
poorest quintiles being under the age of 35 (Klasen and Woolard 1997, quoted in May 
2000, p82). By adding age to race, gender and location Klasen and Woolard identified 
six categories of unemployed I 5. The two groups which find the greatest difficulty in 
15 Klasen and Woolard's six groups comprise; i) the poorly educated rural unemployed (28%), ii) the poorly 











Public Works as a Response to Labour Market Failure. 
Masters in Economics Dissertation, University of Cape Town, July 2002. 
Chapter 2 
finding formal sector employment are i) the youth unemployed with no labour market 
experience, who comprise 36% of the total, and ii) the poorly educated rural unemployed, 
who contribute 28% of the total. The latter group is almost exclusively African, 
predominantly female, and concentrated in K waZulu Natal, the Eastern Cape, Limpopo 
and the North West, provinces with high concentrations of rural poverty. 
Policy Responses to Segmented Unemployment 
Each category of unemployed requires different policy responses, and while for the youth 
unemployed training-based interventions are the most appropriate, such programmes are 
of little benefit for the deep rural female African unemployed, given the scarcity of 
employment opportunities in these areas (Bhorat 2001 and Kingdon and Knight 2001). 
Given the high incidence of employment among the deep rural African population, the 
policy challenge therefore is to identifY instruments which would benefit this group, who 
are characterised by Bhorat (2001, p40) as the 'unemployable' by virtue of their lack of 
skills and the remoteness of their rural location in relation to labour demand16, and who 
fall outside the scope of current employment interventions. Public works programming is 
one econOInically feasible policy response which can be targeted at this group, having the 
potential to address the 'unemployability' of these segments of the South African 
long-tenn unemployed with no labour market experience (6%), v) those with labour market experience and 
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population. The feasibility of a public works response to labour market failure and the 
resultant 45% non-urban African unemployment rate is discussed in detail in chapters 4 
to 7. 
16 Bhorat describes as 'unemployable' the group comprising older unemployed individuals with very little 
formal education residing in deep rural areas, who are 'never going to find sustainable, long-term employment 
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Chapter 3: Causes of Unemployment in South Africa 
The current high levels of unemployment in South Africa are the consequence structural 
trends over the last thirty years which have led to a steady decline in the labour 
absorption capacity of South Africa's economy (Fallon and de Silva 1994). Annual 
employment growth reached a high of approximately 4% in the early 1970s, but has been 
declining since this time (Lewis 2001a). The causes of this growth in unemployment are 
a combination of changes in the structure of the South African economy, domestic 
political and policy shifts, and the broader effects global economic integration. 
Structural Transformation of the South African Economy 
The structural transformation of the economy has entailed a shift in sectoral composition 
and increasing technology intensity leading to a situation characterised by Lewis (2001a, 
piii) as one of 'high unemployment and negligible job creation'. This has had a major 
impact on both total employment levels and the composition of labour demand, leading to 
stagnation in the absolute number of jobs in the economy during the 1990s (McCord & 
Bhorat 2002), and a significant fall in the demand for unskilled labour (Bhorat & 
Hodge 1999). 
The share of the primary and secondary sectors in the South African economy has 
declined since the 1980s relative to the tertiary sector, the only sector to show substantial 
annual real growth over the same period, while both primary sectors, agriculture and 
mining, are in secular decline (Bhorat 2001a). Since demand for unskilled labour is 
concentrated in the primary sector, one implication of this structural change is a reduction 
in the demand for unskilled labour (Abedian 2001). At the same time the skills profile of 
labour demanded by all sectors in the economy has changed significantly, with demand 
for unskilled labour exhibiting a downward trend as a proportion of total labour demand 
in all sectors since the early 1970s due to shifts in production technology and rising 
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the mining and agriculture sectors as a result of major consolidation during the 1980s, 
which exacerbated the fall in labour demand in an already highly capital intensive 
structure of production17. This increase in capital intensity was largely due to· the relative 
economic isolation of the South African economy during the previous dispensation, and 
political concerns with self reliance. 
The consequence of this structural transformation has been a reduction in employment, 
and the skills bias arising from the change in the structure of the labour market has meant 
that that resulting unemployment has been concentrated among the unskilled. Levels of 
formal sector employment declined in every year but three between 1981 and 1999, with 
the loss of l.3 million unskilled formal sector jobs (Lewis 200 la, pii). Between 1993 and 
1998 the average annual job losses were estimated to be 5.5% in mining, 4.3% in 
construction, 2.1% in transport, 1.4% in utilities and 0.9% in agriculture (Wilson 2001, 
p21). 
Domestic Political Change 
South Africa experienced a further intensification of this process of structurally declining 
employment as a consequence of the lifting of international sanctions and the 
reintegration of the South African economy into the global market during the 1990s, 
following the change of dispensation in 1994. The associated trade liberalisation and 
increased exposure to international competition exposed the weaknesses of the high 
capital-intensity / low capital productivity basis of the South African economy which 
developed during the previous period of high regulation and protection. The 
consequence of increased international competition is major industrial restructuring in 
terms of increased productivity for manufacturers able to increase their competitiveness, 
and plant closures for less competitive manufacturers, which has led to the loss of one in 
nine manufacturing jobs between 1994 and 2000 (Kaplan 2001). 
17 Lewis (2001a) estimates that if a more labour intensive structure of production were adopted the percentage 
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The new dispensation also introduced a medium term macroeconomic strategy 
prioritising macro-economic stabilisation (1996), which has been characterised by a 
contractionary monetary and fiscal stance. Despite success in terms of key policy 
objectives, most notably inflation targeting and reduction of the current account deficit, 
this strategy has deterred both domestic and international investment by increasing the 
cost of capital and constraining domestic demand, and this has impacted negatively on 
employment. Failure to attract and retain capital investment in South Africa is a key 
determinant of the current poor growth rates, which averaged 1.3% during the 1990s 
(Lewis 200 la, p7) and less than 2% in 2001 (SARB 2002), and inasmuch as 
unemployment is contingent on economic performance, continued poor economic growth 
implies increasing rates of joblessness in the country18. 
Global Unemployment Trends 
While South Africa is an outlier in terms of the severity of its unemployment crisis, the 
structural shift underlying this trend is one mirrored throughout the global economy, with 
a reduction in the numbers of workers needed to produce the goods and services required 
to satisfY global demand, resulting from the ongoing capital intensification of the 
production process. The consequence of this transformation of the production process is 
that globally higher levels of unemployment than were previously considered politically 
tolerable are now the norm; as noted by Solow 1986 'There is a fact, a big unmistakable 
unsubtle fact: Essentially everywhere in the modem industrial capitalist world, 
unemployment rates are much higher than they used to be two or three decades ago' 19. 
This trend has been exacerbated by the increasing global integration of the world 
economy during the twentieth century, which has meant that both production processes, 
and capital are increasingly mobile, following the widespread move towards market and 
of South African manufactured exports compared to those of other developing countries. 
18 This dilemma arising from the negative capital investment consequences of the GEAR strategy has been 
summarised by Powers in the question 'If there is no capital at the microeconomic coalface, what is the 
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capital account liberalisation over the last two decades. Increased integration has 
impacted differentially on various regions and countries, and within the different 
segments of national labour markets, in terms of the distribution of gains and losses. For 
South Allica, integration into the global economy accelerated after 1994, and while the 
net employment impact of increased integration is subject to debate20, analysis by Bhorat 
& Hodge (1999) and Jenkins (2002) indicates that it has contributed to a change in the 
composition of labour demand, resulting in 'significant disemployment at the bottom end 
of the job ladder' (Bhorat 2000, p4S8). 
While South Allica is an outlier in terms of the severity of its unemployment crisis, the 
structural shift underlying this trend is one mirrored throughout the global economy, with 
a reduction in the numbers of workers needed to produce the goods and services required 
to satisfy global demand; as noted by Solow (1986) 'There is a fact, a big unmistakable 
unsubtle fact: Essentially everywhere in the modem industrial capitalist world, 
unemployment rates are much higher than they used to be two or three decades ago,21. 
For South AlliCR, integration into the global economy accelerated after 1994, and while 
the net employment impact of increased integration is subject to debate22, analysis by 
Bhorat & Hodge (1999) and Jenkins (2002) indicates that it has contributed to a change 
in the composition of labour demand, resulting in 'significant disemployment at the 
bottom end of the job ladder' (Bhorat 2000, p4S8). 
The Role of the Informal Sector 
The impact of these domestic and global economic changes has been exacerbated in 
South Allica by the lack of an adequate informal sector employment cushion to absorb 
19 Quoted in Saint-Paul (1996). 
20 See for example Jenkins (2002) who argues that the overall impact ofliberalistion on the labour market in 
South Africa has been negative, compared to Edwards 2001 and Fedderke, Shin and Vaze (2000) who assert 
that is has had a modest positiye effect 
21 Cited in Saint-Paul (1996). 
22 See for example Jenkins (2002) who argues that the overall impact ofliberalistion on the labour market in 
South Africa has been negative, compared to Edwards 2001 and Fedderke, Shin and Vaze (2000) who assert 
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labour shed by the formal sector. The informal sector is relatively under-developed 
compared to other Sub Saharan African countries, primarily as a result of the socio-Iegal 
constraints existing under the Apartheid system which directly and indirectly limited 
informal sector activity among the African population, while the migrant labour system 
contributed to the creation of labour reserves with a heavy economic reliance on formal 
sector wage income (Wilson 1976). Nattrass (1998) estimates that 80% of the small 
informal sector which does exist in South Africa comprises survivalist poverty relief 
oriented activity, rather than viable economic enterprise, hence the capacity of the sector 
to absorb excess unskilled labour is limited. 
The Unemployable 
Apartheid has bequeathed South Africa a legacy of labour market and economic 
characteristics which has meant that the distribution of gains and losses arising from 
domestic policy choices, market liberalisation and global economic trends has impacted 
negatively on the poor African rural population. In current labour market the 
characteristics of labour demand no longer match the skills of the majority of the labour 
supply, leaving a growing number of unskilled workers, particularly in rural areas, 
chronically unable to find work; the labour market is failing, and the 'invisible hand' is 
failing to operate to resolve this imbalance of supply and demand. Leibbrandt and 
Woolard (2001) have argued that the net outcome of such a growth path is likely to be a 
widening of household inequality, driven by a labour market which fails to deliver formal 
employment for increasing sections of the labour market, while improving earnings for 
those retaining formal sector employment. 
The consequence of this market failure is chronic and worsening unemployment, and the 
emergence of a growing category of the poor, described by Bhorat as the 'unemployable' 
(2001, p40) and by Seekings as an 'underclass' (2000, p68) comprised of households 
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and its exclusion from the wage relationship23. This group is effectively economically 
irrelevant as it is excluded from participation in the market due to the lack of demand for 
its only asset, labour; the market economy doesn't need what they have and they can't 
buy what it sells24. The existence of this group provokes the question 'what do we owe 
one another as members of the same society who no longer inhabit the same 
economy?' 25 , a question which characterizes the dilemma of the South African labour 
demand deficit economy of the twenty~first century. 
The high level of unskilled unemployment, and the emergence of groups of 
'unemployable' workers poses a serious challenge to the post Apartheid state, involving a 
political choice as to what level of unemployment is 'tolerable', what priority should be 
accorded to policy responses to this problem and how a response can be accommodated 
within the context of an essentially neo~liberal policy stance. Within the dominant 
political discourse in South Africa, unemployment is characterised primarily as a supply 
side problem, and policy responses developed accordingly26. However the problem with 
this approach is that it does not recognise the significance of the structural changes 
experienced in South Africa over recent decades in creating and sustaining involuntary 
unemployment, particularly in the primary sector. Lewis (200 1 b) highlights the error in 
this characterisation of unemployment, arguing that while supply~side factors, such as 
skills development and labour market inflexibility, do impact on unemployment in South 
Africa, they are subordinate to demand factors relating to structural change. Hence 
supply side interventions are not adequate to address the fundamental structural shifts and 
resultant labour market failure which South Africa is currentlyexperiencing27. 
23 This analysis conforms to closely to Marx's description of the underclass as the lowest grouping within the 
reserve army of labour. 
24 This is a paraphrase of Nathan Gardel's observation regarding the relationship between the unemployed and 
the market, 'From the standpoint of the market the ever swelling ranks of the [unemployed] face a fate worse 
than colonialism: economic irrelevance ... we don't need what they have and they can't buy what we sell', 
quoted in Rifkin 1996 p215. 
25 This question was posed by Reich in 'The Work of Nations; Preparing Ourselves for Twenty-first Century 
Capitalism' 199Z. 
26 The DTI Growth and Employment Strategy (Z001) is an example of this 'supply side failure' characterisation 
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The labour demand deficit is already extreme28, and trends imply that it will increase 
further, with the impact skewed towards the unskilled African population, for whom the 
situation has been described as catastrophic (Kingdon and Knight 2001, pI3). The lack 
of informal sector opportunities or social safety nets makes the unemployed particularly 
vulnerable, and a silent crisis is taking place which the market is unable to remedy. The 
'invisible hand' is increasingly malign inasmuch as market processes are serving to 
intensify the polarisation of the labour force into the employed and the unemployed! 
unemployable. For the reasons outlined in this chapter, the market has failed to deliver 
employment in South Africa, and will continue to fail, irrespective of supply-side 
interventions. Given the constitutional responsibility of the state to protect the socio-
economic rights of its citizens, urgent interventions are now required to defuse the social, 
political and humanitarian breakdown which continuing labour market failure has 
initiated. 
27 Kingdon and Knight also argue that supply side interventions (upgrading human capital) will not solve the 
unemployment problem since the critical factor is one of net labour demand deficit (2001, p 23). 
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Chapter 4: Job Creation and Public Works, an Analytical Framework for 
Programme Design 
Given the failure of the market to provide sufficient employment in South Africa, direct 
policy intervention is urgently required to address the joint challenges of poverty and 
unemployment29. Internationally policy responses to unemployment range from the 
demand oriented Keynesian expansionary fiscal stance and direct employment creation 
schemes on the one hand30, to neo-classical supply side interventions and the creation of 
a more flexible labour force on the other31 . In the context of the current South African 
unemployment crisis a supply side intervention is inadequate due to the characteristics of 
the unemployed, the structural causes of the demand deficit, and the scale of the deficit 
(Lewis 2001 a, Bhorat 2001), and for this reason a demand oriented policy response is 
critical. It is not lack of skills, but net lack of employment which is the critical factor. 
While an increase in the skills level of the labour force will meet the structural demand 
for skilled workers, this demand is not sufficient in scale to absorb the majority of the 
unemployed, and nor will skilled workers in deep rural areas be significantly more likely 
to find employment. Hence a supply side response is only partial, and marginal in terms 
of the broader issue of unskilled rural and youth unemployment (Kingdon and Knight 
2001). 
Demand oriented policy responses to unemployment may be separated into three main 
categories; formal sector employment generation, informal sector employment generation 
and public works. Each of these responses will be discussed in more detail below, and an 
analytical framework for public works programme design outlined. 
29 The need to reconsider the role of the state given the 'limitations of the marker in terms of employment 
provision is recognised in the Employment and Growth Strategy Framework Paper, prepared by the 
Department of Trade and Industry in 2001. 
30 This approach is typified by the US response to the Great Depression in the 19308, when massive state 
expenditure and public works progcammes were initiated to absorbed up to 30% of the unemployed nationally, 
in an attempt to stimulate consumer demand and prevent deepening of the economic recession. 
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Formal Sector Employment Creation 
Fonnal sector employment generation is directly linked to the goal of economic growth 
through a process of mutual reinforcemene2, and this characterises the dominant South 
African policy response, outlined in the Department of Trade and Industry Employment 
and Growth strategy (2001). This approach aims at job creation primarily within the 
'information sector', as part of a strategy to reposition South Africa globally as a 
predominantly knowledge based economy, capitalising on the fact that the tertiary sector 
is the only area currently contributing to employment growth. This approach addresses 
mass unemployment and poverty reduction only indirectly, mediated through increased 
GDP in the long term, in a contemporary version of the contested 'trickle down' 
approach. A successful outcome of this strategy, in terms of arresting the fall in formal 
sector employment, is contingent on annual GDP growth of rates of 6% being achieved 
(GEAR 1996). However, it is unlikely that growth in tertiary sector activity will be 
sufficient to stimulate significant increases in GDP growth or employment given current 
growth performance of only 2% (SARB 2002). If this level of growth were however 
attained, the resulting employment demand would be primarily for skilled labour, further 
contributing to the skills bias in the labour market, and would not address the needs of 
those groups suffering the highest incidence of unemployment, or its most severe 
consequences. While this strategy has the potential to promote economic growth and 
skilled employment, it does not address the structural unskilled labour deficit. 
Informal Sector Employment Creation 
The second category of policy responses to employment creation is informal sector 
employment generation, which primarily occurs through the creation of SMMEs and 
micro-credit organisations. These approaches aim primarily at skills development and 
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transformation33 in order to stimulate informal sector activity. However the scale of 
SMME and micro-credit engendered employment growth is not sufficient to redress the 
massive structural labour deficit (Lewis 2001ai4. Also, SMME interventions tend to be 
concentrated at the top end of the informal sector, thereby excluding the most 
marginalized, since the poorest have less access to the human and financial capital 
required to participate in SMME activity. More importantly informal sector employment 
generation assumes the existence of sufficient levels of latent demand in the economy to 
respond to new sources supply, on the basis of the Say's law assumption that supply 
creates its own demand. This assumption may fail in cash poor areas, or areas where 
supply already exceeds demand, as this response does not address the fundamental labour 
demand deficit problem. 
Only the third category of policy response, public works, is explicitly concerned with 
both poverty alleviation and job creation. The primary purpose of public works 
programming is poverty alleviation through labour absorption, and this is frequently 
achieved through the creation of public assets using labour intensive methods. Public 
works schemes function as a social safety net by directly increasing unskilled labour 
demand and making direct wage transfers to participants. Such schemes have the 
potential to absorb a large percentage of excess labour; during the Great Depression 
public works schemes in the US absorbed up to 30% of the unemployed labour force 
(Rifkin 1996), while in Tunisia and Mauritius similar programmes accounted for between 
20 and 40% of the unemployed during the early 1970s, and the Maharashtra Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (lVlEGS) in India absorbed up to 75% of available person days in rural 
Maharashtra State in 1977 (Maxwell 1978, quoted in Reynolds 1984). 
33 Transfonnation is the tenn used to refer to policy interventions aimed at redressing the racially skewed 
distribution of enterprises mid economic activity within the South African economy. arising from the historical 
constraints of Apartheid. 
34 Lewis highlights the fact that SMME employment growth is tending to arising as a result of the creation of 
new SMME finns, while existing Sl\IMEs are tending to reduce their labour demand, which leads hin1 to 
question the policy of continued new SMME creation as a strategy for net employment creation (2001 a, pill). 
Nattrass (1998) and Bhorat md Liebbrandt (1998) both make an associated critique of the micro-credit 
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Given the portfolio of job creation policy options available, public works offer the best 
match with the profile of unemployment in South Africa, having the potential to match 
the scale of the unemployment problem, while also directly addressing poverty 
alleviation, and at the same time responding to the national priority of infrastructure 
creation35. The potential of public works to carry out this major labour absorption 
function was explicitly recognised in GEAR, which called for the creation of 100,000 
new jobs per year by 2000 through labour based infrastructural development and 
maintenance (GEAR 1996). This strategy however was not subsequently implemented, 
largely due to bureaucratic capacity constraints and shifting priorities, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section. 
A Definition of Public Works 
Public works are based on the fundamental concept that the most abundant asset of the 
poor is their labour, and that if demand for this labour is increased, incomes and hence 
welfare will increase accordingly. In a public works scheme the state, or an agent acting 
on its behalf, develops programmes of public work in order to create increased demand 
for labour, often using labour intensive techniques to enhance the amount of employment 
absorbed. The goal is most frequently to absorb labour in order to effect an income 
transfer and hence reduce poverty. This is often done in association with the creation of 
infra structural assets, and may also entail secondary objectives relating to supply side 
improvements such as skills transfers, or political objectives implicitly aimed at the 
diffusion of instability. 
oriented activity, rather than dynamic expansionist enterprises, thereby questioning the potential of this sector 
to make a significant contribution to the national employment crisis. 
35 An expansionary infrastructure programme to accelerate delivery on the backlogs of social infrastructure was 
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A Public Works Analytical Framework 
Public works are however a highly heterogeneous instrument, and need to be designed to 
address the specific characteristics of labour demand deficit in different contexts in order 
to achieve the absorption of surplus labour, poverty alleviation and asset creation in the 
most effective way. The success of a public works programme is contingent on correctly 
defining the labour market problem and designing the programme response accordingly. 
An analytical framework outlining the key design components of a public works 
programme, and the range of options within each is set out below, see figure 2, and then 
discussed with reference to the South African context. 
Fi2ure 1; Public Works Analytical Framework 









Public Works Objectives 
(Asset creation) (Asset creation) 
Acute B Chronic 
Natural disaster Structural shift in economy 
Short Term B Long Term 
Targeted B Universal 
MicroeconomicB Macroeconomic 
Multiple Job Creation Projects B Increase Labour Intensivity of 
Government Expenditure 
Public works programmes have the objectives of poverty alleviation and/or poverty 
reduction, and asset creation. At their simplest a public works programmes have the 
objective of poverty alleviation through a transfer to increase household income. This 
intervention does not break the poverty cycle, or address household mobility, but relieves 
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stochastic shocks, and diminishing the size of the poverty gap. Even when transfer 
benefits are smalL income stabilization can preempt acute distress, and hence the 
insurance function of a transfer is as important as its transfer function: Subbarao 
confirms the validity of such interventions, arguing with reference to a public works 
programme offering five days employment per household per month that while 'This 
small level of job creation is clearly insufficient to raise the incomes of poor families' the 
smoothing benefits were considerable (1997, p6), an argument supported by Walker and 
Ryan in relation to the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme, who also highlight 
the consumption smoothing or 'risk benefits' accruing from a simple transfer programme 
(1990). 
When poverty reduction is the goal, participants must be enabled to acquire sufficient 
financial and human capital assets to move out of poverty, and a more complex 
programme is required including skills training and/or micro-credit. This approach has a 
greater emphasis on supply factors, and is contingent on matching skills training and 
micro-credit with demand in the local economy, rather than the creation of demand36. 
The Kenyan Jua Kali programme is an example of a poverty oriented reduction public 
works programme, based on skills development and training with the state provision of 
inputs (tools, workshops etc) to promote informal labour market activity in the context of 
scare formal wage opportunities37. 
The scale of poverty reduction programmes tends to be smaller than that of programmes 
focused exclusively on poverty alleviating welfare transfers, but the impact for those who 
participate is greater in terms of moving out of poverty, and the local economic impact is 
likely to be more dynamic and sustainable, if there is sufficient labour demand. The 
relative merits of each approach must be considered in relation to the specific 
characteristics of the labour market problem to be addressed. 
36 In the absence of labour market demand for skilled labour, eg in deep rural areas, skills training may not be 
an effective component of public works programming (Bhorat 2001 and Kingdon and Knight 2001). 
37 The programme is linked to the creation of shelter and housing assets, and forms a component of the 
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However, public works programmes are not only driven by poverty objectives, they also 
respond to existing demand for asset creation and maintenance, and consequently are 
critically different from simple welfare initiatives38. Public works programmes match 
excess labour supply with unmet demand for infrastructure creation, a factor which is 
particularly relevant in the South African context given the inequitable distribution of 
infrastructure under the previous dispensation, and the political commitment to 
widespread asset provision (housing, rural road construction etc). The United States 
programmes of the 1930s and the current Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(MEGS) characterise this response, focusing on meeting immediate household welfare 
needs while creating national infrastructure, including schools, roads, embankments and 
wells. 
The clarification and prioritisation of the objectives of a public works programme is 
critical for successful implementation. Poverty alleviation programmes are the simplest 
to manage, creating jobs and offering a financial transfer in return, while poverty 
reduction programmes tend also to include micro-credit and or training objectives. 
Additional functions such as community empowerment, capacity building and 
transformation have also been added to the public works concept in South Africa39, and 
in some instances this plurality of objectives has hindered progress on the primary job 
creation objective. The multiplicity of objectives ascribed to South African labour-
intensive public works programmes led Adato et al (1999, p xiii) to argue, 'Relief and 
development, income generation and empowerment, jobs today and training for future 
jobs ... is ... without a precedent elsewhere in the world.' The cost of this unprecedented 
approach is illustrated by the performance of the National Community Based Public 
Works Programme which in 1999/2000 created only 2,000 sustainable and 20,000 
unsustainable jobs at a cost of R3 77 million. This conceptualisation of public works 
38 It is important to note that when discussing targeting with reference to public works that many destitute 
households, especially female or child-headed households, may not have an adult who can go out to work, 
particularly given the high incidence of HIV I AIDS, and that these households are thereby excluded from the 
benefits of participation. For this reason, among others, public works programs are not an alternative to social 
safety net responses to poverty in South Africa, such as the Basic Income Grant. 
39 'This range of objecti\~es are included in the strategy of the National Programme for Public Works, 
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programming as a transfonnational tool, rather than a tool to address the national 
employment crisis explains the poor perfonnance and high cost of South African 
interventions to date40 . The South African unemployment problem is· a problem of 
massive scale, and if a public works programme is given additional objectives related to 
the more diffuse and complex goal of transfonnation, achievement of the primary goal of 
job creation may be undermined, and the value of the intervention in tenns of poverty 
alleviation and asset creation substantially reduced. 
The Nature of the Employment Deficit 
If an employment deficit is acute, occurring as the result of a natural disaster, such as 
floods in Mozambique, or a drought in Maharashtra, or a cyclical labour demand deficit 
related to the agricultural cycle, a local response is required which compensates in the 
short tenn for the loss of employment opportunities. This response must be implemented 
rapidly and be synchronized with the period of demand deficit in order to address 
immediate welfare needs and prevent the crisis selling of assets which could drive 
households into chronic poverty. 
If the employment deficit is chronic however, arising for example from structural labour 
market shifts, as in South Africa, or economic transition, then a longer tenn solution is 
needed which generates sustainable employment opportunities on a national scale which 
are targeted to the characteristics of those worst affected. In this context the rapidity of 
implementation is less important than sustainability, appropriate targeting and scale. In 
the case of South Africa the analysis in chapter two implies that a programme able to 
deliver sustainable labour demand to Africans, particularly women, in deep rural areas is 
required. 
40 Gwagwa, the Director of the Integrated Development Trust responsible for implementing the national 
programme explained the low nwnber of jobs created, and high costs in terms of the fact that 'For us [South 
Africa] ... it's the issue of content as opposed to necessarily scale, because scale does not address the South 
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Public Works Timescale 
A short term intervention is appropriate when the employment deficit is temporary and 
welfare is undennined on a short term basis. However, in a situation of chronic labour 
demand deficit, a short term job creation initiative may have little poverty alleviation or 
reduction impact, and may even exacerbate household welfare41 . In the chronic 
unemployment scenario a short term intervention focusing on poverty alleviation will 
have negligible impact beyond the immediate period of the transfer, as it will not pennit 
household consumption smoothing, or reduce vulnerability to stochastic shock, neither is 
it likely to entail sufficient capital accumulation to enable movement out of poverty. 
Equally, a short period of training or job experience is unlikely to have a significant 
impact on human capital accumulation (Adato et al 1999) or prospects for finding 
employment in the context of a labour demand deficit of the South African scale 42, while 
short-term micro-credit interventions are by definition not sustainable43 . 
From a technical and administrative/managerial perspective the design and 
implementation of public works programmes within short term planning and 
implementation horizons is not cost-effective (phillips et al 1995 and McCutcheon 
2001c44). Short term planning horizons may compromise the quality or appropriateness 
of the asset created and programme management. Equally importantly, public works 
programmes typically experience high start up costs during the initial period of training 
and systems development, which may range from a period of months to a period of 
several years, depending on the scale and complexity of the project, with a programme 
41 Anecdotal ev-idence sUgl,>ests that in some cases household welfare may deteriorate after participation in a 
short term job creation programme, due to shifts in household consumption patterns and increased 
indebtedness (D Homer, SALDRU, University of Cape Town, personal communication, 2002). 
42 There has been little research in South Africa to evaluate the impact of skills training on successful job search 
among the different segments of the unemployed, nor among the unemployed as an aggregate. This evaluation 
is required urgently in order to assess the effectiveness of training aspects of public works programming 
43 Micro-credit is based on the development over time of a financial relationship between the agents involved, 
and the transfer of skills for business development This cannot be achieved in a short term framework. 
44 McCutcheon argues that short term interventions entail an 'almost inevitable loss of concentration upon 
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only reaching efficient levels of output and cost efficiency after this initial start up 
phase 45, this is illustrated schematically in figure 3. 
Figure l: Minimum efficient project len h 
Cost Minimum efficient proiect length 
t* Time 
Hence short term programmes are likely to expenence high costs and sub-optimal 
outcomes, in terms of programme impact, quality and cost effectiveness. 
The nature and value of the assets created however, also influences the long-term 
employment and income-creation effects of short term public works programs. If assets 
engender large and sustainable employment multiplier effects, then a short term 
intervention may be appropriate. This is contingent on the assets created through public 
works being in line with local or national priorities, their ability to stimulate ongoing 
economic activity, and the inclusion of a maintenance component in the budget design, to 
prevent asset deterioration post construction (de Bruyn 2002). If the assets created 
enhance the welfare of the poor (by improving rural access to markets, or providing 
45 See Phillips et al 1995 for a detailed discussion of the timeframes for civil engineering public works 
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Primary Health Care facilities for example), this will further improve the welfare impact 
of an intervention. 
Hence, economic and job creation impacts are likely to be greater, and costs lower for 
long run public works programmes. The value of investment in short term public works 
interventions in the context of chronic unemployment is limited in terms of direct 
employment creation, but through the creation of appropriately prioritised and funded 
assets, such interventions may have a positive multiplier effect. In the South African 
context however, there is no economic analysis to indicate that sustained positive 
employment gains have accrued from short term public works interventions, at either 
household or community level; further work is urgently required in this area, to ascertain 
the economic the validity of ongoing short term public works interventions. 
Beneficiaries and Targeting 
Public works programmes may be universal or targeted, depending on the characteristics 
of the labour deficit, the objectives of the programme, and the resources available. 
Universal public works programmes are open to all who are seeking work, and are 
characterised by the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme, and the Swedish 
unemployment programme (Ginsburg 1983). The success of a universal scheme is 
however contingent on an adequate scale of operation; if sufficient jobs are created to 
meet demand programme objectives will be met, but if demand exceeds the number of 
jobs created, over -subscription will lead to rationing, and the programme will no longer 
be universal. 
Given the limitations frequently imposed on universal interventions by fiscal constraints, 
particularly in a context of poor economic growth, a targeted programme may be more 
cost-effective and have a greater poverty alleviation impact In this case the targeting 
criteria are critical, and depending on the scale of unemployment and the amount of jobs 
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official public works targeting criteria tend to be set extremely loosely, focusing on 
women, children and the disabled, and excluding any explicit reference to poverty, see 
for example the Department of Public Works Annual Report 2000-1. Such lose criteria 
seem inadequate in the context of 37% unemployment, representing some 7 million 
jobless, with 70% of the poor unemployed, when the public works effort nationally is 
creating less than 100,000 jobs each year46. Currently the demand for employment in 
public works programmes far outstrips public works supply, and hence extreme levels of 
rationing are taking place. Given the fact that jobs created in public works programmes 
are scare resources, their allocation is of critical importance if poverty alleviation is to be 
achieved and in this context strategic targeting is critical. The female/youth/disabled 
criteria currently in use in South Africa render public works a very blunt instrument in 
terms of anti-poverty programming. Without adequate targeting public works 
programmes are generalised transfer programmes, rather than anti-poverty programmes, a 
critical insight which is frequently overlooked in the international literature. 
Internationally the main mechanisms used for targeting public works are geographical 
programme targeting (focusing on poor areas), random lottery based selection, 
community selection, the use of demographic criteria and self-targeting based on wage 
levels. The wage level is the dominant instrument for targeting, often used in conjunction 
with other techniques, based on the assumption that if public works wages is set at or 
below the prevailing wage, the resultant self selection will exclude the non-poor, as 
Ravallion asserts, 'provided the wage rate is low enough it will self-select poor 
participants while not undermining their incentive to take up other jobs when available. A 
low wage rate will also help assure a good distribution of benefits amongst the poor,47. 
This approach has two potential drawbacks. While retaining a low wage maximises the 
number of participants in the scheme per unit of expenditure, it also entails lower transfer 
earnings per poor participant. Secondly, in a high unemployment context, even a low 
4<S Estimate derived from Department of Public Works 2001, and Special Allocation for Poverty Relief Progress 
Reports 1992. 










Public Works as a Response to Labour Market Failure. 
Masters in Economics Dissertation, University of Cape Town, July 2002. 
Cbapter4 
programme wage may not ensure exclusion of those who are not the poorest; since the 
poor are the majority in many areas, and employment opportunities scarce, access to 
wage income may be attractive to the non-poorest and hence undermine the intended 
impact of targeting - in this instance self targeted programmes may provide jobs for the 
poor, but no necessarily the poorest. This approach is particularly problematic when 
demand for employment exceeds supply, which is the case in most South African 
schemes (Adato et al 1999, McCord 2001). If the poor are conceptualised as a single 
entity then this approach is adequate, inasmuch as it transfers resources to the poor, but if 
the poor are disaggregated in terms of the depth of their poverty, a more heterogeneous 
population emerges, and a more subtle form of targeting is required to ensure that poverty 
among the lower deciles is addressed. If public works programmes are to be used as an 
instrument of poverty alleviation, as well as job creation, more stringent targeting is 
essential. 
Programme design is also important here, as if programmes are to be targeted to address 
the needs of a specific demographic group, such as the female African rural poor 
identified above, the programme needs to be one which will extend to the deep rural areas 
where female African unemployment is concentrated. In this instance, rural road 
maintenance, rather than for example, hospital construction, would be particularly 
appropriate. 
In order to avoid the grossest targeting errors, wages should be set no higher than the 
prevailing market wage for unskilled labour, as if it were set above the market wage 
labour market distortions could ensue48. In the absence of a legal minimum wage, the 
wage may be set at or below the prevailing wage 49. Drawing on an analysis of MEGS, 
Datt and Ravallion (1994) argue that too high a wage can erode the effectiveness of 
poverty targeting with perverse anti poverty consequence. The MEGS wage was set at 
the Indian minimum wage, which was lower than the market wage, until in 1988 it was 
48 In some cases the wage level may be dictated by the legally binding minimum wage, which may be above or 
below ruling market wage 
49 In Chile public works remuneration was set at 70% of the minimum wage, while in India it is set at the 
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revised upwards above the market wage. The result of shifting the public works wage 
above the market wage was increased demand for public works employment, job 
rationing, an erosion of the 'guarantee' element of the programme, and hence a reduction 
in the effectiveness of poverty targeting. Studies of public works in Tanzania, Botswana, 
Kenya and the Philippines, also indicate that programme wages set above the market rate 
for unskilled labour, attracted the non-poorest, and led to increased job rationing 
(Subbarao 1997). 
Hence the relationship between the programme wage and the ruling market wage is 
critical in terms of ensuring some measure of poverty targeting. However, in the context 
of mass unemployment, wage-based self selection alone is an inadequate instrument, as 
in a severely depressed economy excess demand for jobs will lead to rationing, even at a 
low wage. In this case additional criteria, based on demographic characteristics are 
required in order to guarantee an anti-poverty impact. 
In order to assess the effectiveness of targeting and the poverty impact of public works 
programmes, baseline data is required to establish the characteristics of programme 
participants, and panel follow up is required to assess the anti-poverty impact of the 
intervention over time. This data is rarely available (World Bank 2002a), and none is 
currently available in South Africa. However, if public works programmes are to be 
adequately assessed in terms of their validity as poverty alleviation, rather than simply 
job creation instruments, further work in this area is required. 
Economic Objective 
If immediate micro-economic, or household poverty is the objective of public works 
programming, then it is necessary to focus on transferring resources to the most 
vulnerable households, as discussed above, by means of poverty targeting. However, if 
community or district economic renewal is the objective, or macro-economic growth 
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programmes would be critical, as would the growth potential of the areas selected. The 
selection of priority areas and participants for these two economic objectives may not be 
consistent, and can lead to tension in programme design. In order to avoid confusion in 
implementation, the economic priorities need to be established, as a programme will not 
necessarily serve both sets of goals. In South Africa the most appropriate and effective 
strategy has not yet been agreed and programming tends to represent a mix of the two. 
Programme Concept 
The traditional conceptualisation of a public works programme consists of a specific job 
creation initiative, implemented at a local, regional or national level. Some programmes 
are national in scope, such as the Indian Iawahar Rojgra Y ojna which created up to one 
billion workdays per year during the 1990s (Subbarao 1997), while others are more 
localised, such as those administered under the Community Based Public Works 
Programme in South Africa. Funds are allocated to these programmes to create 
additional employment opportunities, usually through the construction or maintenance of 
infrastructure, and often using labour intensive methods to increase absorptive capacity. 
However there is an alternative, broader conceptualization of public works programming, 
based on the concept of increasing the labour intensivity of mainstream government 
expenditure on infrastructure creation and maintenance. Under this approach current 
public sector capital expenditure itself offers an opportunity to generate employment, 
without additional demands on the fiscus. In support of this approach McCutcheon 
highlights the discrepancy in scale between state expenditure on the construction 
industry, and its investment in public works programming, arguing that marginal 
expenditure allocations are inadequate in response to the major structural problem of 
unemployment5o. McCutcheon argues that 'a public works programme should be aimed 
at fundamentally changing the way in which publicly funded infrastructure is built so that 
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employment and skills transfer are maximised for the unemployed' (McCutcheon 1995, 
p23). 
In this way government would use the opportunity of budgeted major capital expenditure 
on public infrastructure to contribute directly to labour intensive employment creation 
rather than redirecting funding to employment programmes per se. This conception of 
public works calls for the reorientation of line ministries in terms of the labour intensivity 
of their own activity, and contracting. In order to achieve this the state would need to 
promote labour intensification in the provision of infrastructure by regulating the terms 
under which public contracts are granted. Since the state comprises 75% of the client 
base of the civil engineering sector in South Africa, it has the potential leverage to dictate 
modifications in terms of increasing the labour intensivity of operations in this sector 
(McCutcheon 2001b). 
The assumption underlying this approach is that labour intensive civil engineering 
methods are directly comparable to capital intensive techniques in terms of cost and 
quality, providing certain conditions are fulfilled51 (Phillips et al 1995) and the 
implication is that a major expansion of employment may be generated through budgeted 
government expenditure. If centrally coordinated this approach would entail 
considerable economies of scale in public works programming nationally, for example 
reducing the development of parallel management structures and administrations, and 
establishing systems for targeting, monitoring and evaluation 52. Such an approach need 
not be considered in opposition to public works programming in the conventional sense, 
51 The basic principles for effective labour intensive construction, in terms of cost and quality parity are as set 
out in the engineering discourse by McCutcheon, Phillips et al may be summarised as; appropriate materials 
and design for labour intensive construction, the development of improved labour intensive construction 
techniques, the use of pilot projects to establish correct practice, tendering and construction administration 
process adaptions, small contractor development programmes, community participation, and effective 
supervision. 
52 Each of these issues is an area of inefficiency under the current public works scenario in South Africa (Adato 
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but could, over time, have the potential to absorb a far greater amount of labour and at a 
lower unit cost 53. 
With the exception of the writings of McCutcheon, Philips et al in South Africa54, there is 
little documentation on the broad conceptualisation of public works programming within 
in the international public works literature, which instead focuses on public works as an 
additional programming instrument, rather than an integral part of state infrastructure 
delivery. Research to explore the anti-poverty and macro-economic implications of this 
approach in South Africa is necessary in order to assess the potential gains of such a 
radical approach. 
The South African Conceptualisation of Public Works 
The South African National Public Works Programme was originally conceptualised as 
an instrument for asset and employment creation, as part of 'the systematic re-orientation 
of public sector approaches to infrastructure provision' (NEF 1994), and was to be 
supported by the Construction Industry Development Programme, which was charged 
with the development and dissemination of best practice guidelines for labour based 
construction in pursuit of the same goal. The merits of this approach were also 
recognised in GEAR (1996), which argued that 100,000 new jobs would be created each 
year through labour intensive responses to the creation and maintenance of infrastructure. 
However, successive policy shifts and the reprioritisation of objectives in the Department 
of Public Works have reduced the relative priority of employment creation through the 
labour intensification of infrastructural provision. A proliferation of alternative 
objectives attached to public works programming have obscured the more fundamental 
objective, and rather than reorienting national policy on capital expenditure and labour 
53 The KwaZulu Natal Zibambele programme illustrates the potential for increasing labour intensity without 
increasing cost per unit output (McCord 2001) in the context of one provincial line ministry, and the 
implication of this programme is that the opportunity for creating employment by transforming the broader 
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intensivity, the Department of Public Works instead focus on more conventional add-on 
public works programming within the National Public Works Programme55. 
Conclusion 
The public works analytical framework set out in figure 1 sets out the range of design 
options which may be considered within the concept of public works. In the context of 
the chronic unemployment and poverty situation in South Africa, long term, targeted 
demand side labour market responses are required, which may be directed at household 
level poverty alleviation and asset creation. The implication of this analysis is that short 
term and poorly targeted public works programmes may not be effective instruments in 
response to the current crisis, and that the policy priority should be the development of 
longer term, sustainable, coordinated public works programmes creating and maintaining 
strategic assets, which will sui generis also contribute to poverty alleviation and welfare. 
Such a programme may either be achieved by redirecting existing public works budgets, 
or by a more fundamental reorientation of the state's construction and maintenance 
allocations, to promote labour intensification throughout its programme of works. 
54 This literature is primarily technically rather than economically oriented. 
55 Rather than reorienting infrastructural investment throughout the administration, the Department of Public 
Works contribution to public works was limited to the administration of the National Public Works 
Programme, which in 2000/1 represented only 9% of its total budget, and created only 2,196 sustainable and 
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Chapter 5: The Zibambele Programme, A Case Study from KwaZulu Natal 
Having discussed the chronic unemployment crisis in South Africa, the close relationship 
between poverty and unemployment, and the range of potential state intervention 
responses, a case study of how deep rural unemployment and asset creation may be 
addressed through the labour intensification of maintenance and construction work will 
now be presented. The case study is the Zibambele Programme56, administered by the 
Department of Transport in KwaZulu Natal. KwaZulu Natal has a high concentration of 
unemployment in deep rural areas, corresponding to Klasen's second most populous 
group of the unemployed57, for whom it is particularly difficult to create employment 
opportunities, due to lack of skills and inaccessibility. This group poses a particular 
challenge in terms of job creation/anti-poverty programming, and hence it is useful to 
examine the impact of a programme designed specifically to address their needs. The 
Zibambele programme will be described in some detail in this chapter, and a full impact 
analysis carried out in chapter 6. 
Poverty and Unemployment in KwaZulu Natal 
KwaZulu Natal has a population of 9.5 million (Bureau of Market Research 2001), of 
whom more than 40% live in poverty with household expenditure falling below the 
household subsistence line (HSL)58, while 10% of households live on less than 50% of 
the subsistence line (Carter and May 2001). The implementation of the 1998 KwaZulu 
Natal Income Distribution Survey (KIDS), which followed up 1171 households 
previously surveyed in KwaZulu Natal in the 1993 SALDRU Living Standards 
Measurement Survey, has enabled detailed modeling of dynamic poverty trends in the 
province, and led to the identification of increases in the headcount poverty between 1993 
56 'Zibambele' means 'doing it for ourselves' in Zulu. 
57 The poorly educated rural unemployed, who comprise 28% of the total unemployed, are almost exclusively 
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and 1998 as well as an increasingly unequal distribution of per capita expenditure (ibid). 
Underlying this trend is a skewed pattern of income mobility in which initially better-off 
households display more upward mobility than initially poorer households. Carter and 
May argue that shocks, vulnerability and imperfect financial markets prevent the initially 
poor from building uo asset stocks, thereby catching them in a poverty trap with 65% of 
those below the HSL in 1993 remaining there in 1998. The resilience of households and 
their sensitivity to shocks was found to be the critical factor in detennining their ability to 
accumulate, and failure to accumulate at heart of persistent poverty. Labour market 
participation was found to be the key determinant of household resilience, and hence 
household welfare. 
Average non-urban unemployment rates in KwaZulu Natal are 28.6% (narrow) and 
43.5% (broad) (LFS :WO 1), closely mirroring the national unemployment distribution, see 
table 6 below. For this reason a public works case study based on this province is 
particularly appropriate. 
10 ment Rates b Gender and Location 
Narrow 
Total Male Female Male Female 
KwaZulu Natal 
Total 26.4 27.2 25.6 
Urban 24.9 23 .1 26.9 
Non- 28.6 34.2 23.8 
urban 
National 
Total 26.4 24.8 28 
Urban 26.2 24.1 28.6 
Non- 26.7 26.4 26.9 
urban 
Source: Labour Force Survey 2001 
Given the high percentage of households living below the poverty line, the extremely 
high levels of non-urban unemployment, and the close correlation between 
58 This figure is based on the Household Subsistence Lines (HSL) definition of poverty. The HSL is based on 
household subsistence neeas, including shelter fuel and transport, as well as food and basic clothing costs, 










Public Works as a Response to Labour Market Failure. 
Masters in Economics Dissertation, University of Cape Town, July 2002. 
Chapter 5 
unemployment and poverty, the potential positive role for rural public works 
programming in this province is considerable. 
The National Context 
The Ministry of Transport's Moving South Africa project, initiated in 1997, called for a 
twenty year strategic framework for the transport sector based on the economic 
participation of the disadvantaged, skills and capacity building and job creation. In 
support of this the subsequent 'Road to Wealth and Job Creation' 59 called for a 'roads 
infrastructure solution to rural unemployment and poverty'. The Zibambele programme 
is one component of the KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport's integrated approach 
to realising this vision. The programme addresses the need to construct and maintain rural 
roads in order to address the infrastructural backlog arising from under-investment in 
roads serving the rural African population during the Apartheid period. Road under-
investment over recent decades has led to a national backlog in maintenance, upgrading 
and rehabilitation estimated at R3.2 billion60, without which the road network faces 
serious deterioration. 
The KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport and Job Creation 
The Zibambele Programme is a public works programme implemented by the Provincial 
Department of Transport in rural KwaZulu Natal in response to the poverty and 
unemployment in the province, with the twin objectives of the maintenance of rural roads 
and the alleviation of rural poverty. The KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport faces 
the joint challenge of chronic under-investment in the maintenance of the rural access 
road network, and an estimated construction requirement of 11,000 km of rural access 
59 Ministry of Transport, February 1998 
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roads in order to provide adequate access to the rural population61 . In line with the vision 
of the National Ministry of Transport62, the Department considers its responsibility for 
social uplift as inseparable from its transportation objectives, as exemplified by the 
Departmental motto, 'Prosperity through Mobility'. In recognition of the urgency of the 
province's social and economic problems, the Department is implementing its transport 
mandate using an approach which addresses long term poverty alleviation, community 
development and conflict resolution as well as the creation of institutions to promote 
democratic accountability. 
The commitment to using transport as an instrument of development is clear in the scope 
of the Departmental Vision; 
'To save lives 
The development of people, the economy and the infrastructure 
Value for money 
Good governance63 
Poverty relief, equality and infrastructural balance' 
In order to achieve this vision the Department has transformed itself during the last three 
years to focus on job creation and poverty alleviation based approaches to the 
maintenance and construction of the road network using contracted labour, and the 
simultaneous creation of the bureaucratic infrastructure required at provincial and district 
level to promote community participation, conflict resolution/prevention, and 
accountability. Three mechanisms have been created to realise these objectives; the 
Zibambele public works programme, the Emerging Contractor system, and the promotion 
of the use oflabour intensive construction approaches. 
61 For criteria determining the need for rural road construction in KwaZulu Natal see the Community Access 
Roads Needs Study, Department of Transport, 1997. 
62 'Road to Wealth andJob Creation', Ministry of Transport, February 1998 
63 The Department of Transport defines the 'Eight Principals of Good Governance' as; Consultation, Access, 
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In the Zibambele programme local households are paid a regular fee in return for 
maintaining a given length of road, on the basis of eight days work per month64. Under 
the Emerging Contractor system, skills are transferred to the unemployed who are then 
preferentially awarded governmental contracts of increasing levels of technical 
complexity with support and training from the Department, while the labour intensive 
programme promotes the use of labour intensive approaches to road construction and 
maintenance throughout the province, where technically appropriate. These schemes are 
not add-on programmes to mainstream Departmental activities, but are central to the 
methodology of all departmental work. Since 2000/1 the Department has adopted a zero-
budgeting approach, whereby resources are allocated on the basis of regional business 
plans which are conditional on the inclusion of Zibambele, Emerging Contractor and 
labour intensive approaches. 
The Zibambele Programme 
The Zibambele programme was initiated in 2000, and its objectives are65; 
• Maintain the province's rural road network 
• Provide destitute rural households which have no other source of income with a 
regular income 
• Put people to work who are unemployable due to their poverty 
• Improve life chances and the contractors and their children (nutrition, education, 
dignity and economic activities) 
• Enable contractors to organise themselves into credit unions and invest savings in 
other productive activities 
• Create sustainable work opportunities 
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There are currently 10,000 Zibambele contractors maintaining approximately one third of 
the current KwaZulu Natal rural road network66. The Zibambele programme is a 
conceptually simple poverty alleviation mechanism, delivering a low level transfer 
(R334) to a household in return for eight days of work per month maintaining a length of 
road to an agreed standard. The part time nature of the work, which may be carried out 
flexibly within the month, is designed in order to accommodate engagement in household 
tasks and other wage or subsistence opportunities which may arise. The work is allocated 
on a household basis, so that if the participating household member falls sick or dies, 
another household member may take up the activity, and hence retain the monthly 
mcome. 
The scheme was initiated and managed by a small and dynamic group within the 
Development Directorate of the Department of Transport, and was initially reliant on 
advisory and implementational support from external social and technical consultants. 
However now the programme is established the Department is increasing in-house 
management and implementation capacity, and accordingly the use of external 
consultants is being reduced. The Department plans to extend the number of contractors 
to 14,000 by the end of the 2002/3 financial year, and ultimately to a maximum of 
40,000. 
Financing 
The Zibambele programme is funded solely from the Department of Transport budget, 
which increased by 26% between 2000/1 and 2001/2 from R856million to Rl,083 
million67. The budget of the rural access roads programme increased from R3 to R250 
million over the five years to 20011268, funded by increases in the provincial transport 
65 Objectives as set out in the KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport's application to the Impumelelo 
Innovation Award Programme, 2000. 
66 It is not possible to give a more exact percentage as the true extent of rural access road network is not known 
and the process of formal logging is currently underway. 
67 KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport Budget Speech 2001/2 
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budget and the reprioritisation of the maintenance and construction of rural access roads 
over black top roads in line with the revised vision of the Department. This allowed for 
the allocation of R33.5 million to the Zibambele programme in 200112, rising to R5S.7 
million in 2002/3, representing approximately 4% of the total provincial transport 
budget69 . The use of Zibambele contractors for road maintenance is now integral to the 
Departmental way of working in terms of meeting its operational/technical commitments, 
and as such the programme has a secure and sustainable resource allocation. 
The Zibambele Budget 
The budget for the Zibambele programme in 2002/3 is R55.7 million. Of this R51 million 
is allocated for contractor salaries, R2.7 million for tools, Rl million for training and Rl 
million for technical support. This budget was calculated on the basis of 10,000 
contractors in April 2002 rising to 14,000 in April 2003, and the co stings phased 
accordingly. The programme and management costs of the Zibambele programme are 
outlined in table 7 below7o. 
69 It should be noted that conventional capital-intensive methods still account for the majority of the 
Departmental budget. and hence the potential for employment generation within the capital intensive 
component is also significant. 
70 The technical support budget line is included in the Zibambele budget in for 2002/3 but not 2001/2, 
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As the scheme expands the cost of the management structure relative to the number of 
Zibambele contractors is falling with management costs comprising 18% of total 






Figure 4: Zibambele Management and 




Source: Own calculations/rom McCord 2001 and Department o/Transport data 
71 Based on a yearly average of 8,000 Zibambele contractors for 2001 / 2 (6,000 in April 2001 rising to 10,000 by 
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This fall occurs over time as systems and procedures are established, labour intensive 
specifications and methods developed and formalised, and management and contracting 
personnel trained, confirming the findings of Phillips et al (1995a), regarding the 
progressive decline in the cost of management and planning components of labour 
intensive programmes. A decline in the management cost also implies a progressive 
reduction in the cost per workday created over time. 
The Selection of Roads for Zibambele Contracting 
The selection of rural access roads for construction, upgrading and maintenance, is based 
on criteria set out in the Community Access Roads Needs Study (CARNS)72, which uses 
a points system to develop a community development index based on the economic 
potential of an area, perceived priority needs, access to services, and the district Human 
Development Index 73. Using the CARNS index as the technical basis for decision 
making, the selection of roads then takes place in consultation with district level Rural 
Road Transport Fora (RRTF), which are elected bodies created by the Department of 
Transport, comprising representatives of key stakeholders from across the community, 
including amakhosi. Since demand for rural access road construction and maintenance 
exceeds the possibility of supply, the establishment of agreed criteria is a key instrument 
for prioritisation, diffusing potential for conflict and corruption in relation to resource 
allocation. Negotiations in the RRTF are mediated by Department of Transport sta.ff, 
together with the social and technical consultants. Once the priority roads for 
reconstruction and maintenance have been identified and agreed by the RRTF and 
Department of Transport, the roads are formally classified as rural access roads prior to 
further investment74. 
72 Community Access Roads Needs Study, KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport, 1997 
73 It should be noted that there is an inherent tension in the CARNS model between the points given for HDI 
and those for economic potential, as low HDI may inhibit realisation of economic potential. 
74 Garity regarding the status and hence responsibility for road maintenance is a critical issue in terms of 
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To be eligible for Zibambele contracting a selected road has first to be upgraded to gravel 
road surface using heavy machinery to ensure that it is of a standard which is 
maintainable by Zibambele contractors. Were a road not upgraded to this standard, 
manual labour-intensive Zibambele inputs may not be technically appropriate or 
effective75 . Once a road has been upgraded, the RRTF may then propose that Zibambele 
contracts are issued for sections of its maintenance, and a decision is reached through 
negotiation between technicians and the RRTF on the basis of technical feasibility and 
local need. 
Considerable investment in technical training related to road construction and 
maintenance, as well as negotiating skills is made in RRTF members in order to enable 
them to perform their consultative/advisory functions effectively and in this way to 
diffuse potential political tensions arising from the selection of roads for construction and 
upgrading, and Zibambele contracting. The RR TF structure serves to support all 
Departmental labour intensive initiatives, and not only the Zibambele programme. It also 
promotes accountability, creating a forum for community participation and engagement 
with state structures, as well as a venue for discussion and practical decision making, 
which is possible due to the participation of Departmental staff and technicians. In the 
absence of effective inter-departmental coordination at district level, the RRTF also 
provides a forum which other sectors of local government may attend, offering the 
potential for improved district coordination and planning76. 
Selection of Zibambele Contractors 
The goal of Zibambele is to select contractors on the basis of need in a transparent and 
democratic way which breaks with the systems of political/ethnic patronage which 
75 There is considerable debate within the civil engineering sector regarding this issue, with McCutcheon and 
others arguing the superiority oflabour intensive construction/upgrading methods for roads which are to be 
maintained labour intensively (McCutcheon 2002, private communication). 
76 The extent to which the RRTFs actually serve a wider coordination function in each district is variable, 
however, it is their potential to serve this critical function as representative structures which is of major 
significance, and could be of broader benefit to the delivery of district services. The successful functioning of 
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currently prevaif7. In order to achieve this goal Zibambele contractors are selected at 
district level by the local community and the RRTF, with support from departmental 
staff Notification of the contracting process is given to the local community by the 
RRTF who invite potential contractors and interested community members to attend a 
meeting at which the contractors are selected, registered and provided with initial 
instruction and equipment. 
Community selection of Zibambele contractors is carried out using the criteria of 
household poverty, unemployment, and female or child headed households78 with support 
from the social consultants. The selection system is generally perceived to be effective, 
although it is potentially open to abuse, and ongoing facilitation is required by 
Department of Transport staff to ensure that the Zibambele programme is not subject to 
political capture 79. In the absence of baseline data on the socio-economic status of those 
selected as contractors it is difficult to estimate the extent to which the programme is 
reaching its intended target group, or the degree of leakage to non-target participants. In 
order to address the effectiveness of targeting and also the anti-poverty impact of the 
programme, a baseline survey is required, together with ongoing longitudinal monitoring. 
Community selection can lead to 'less than optimal poverty targeting but has other 
compensating social benefits' (Adato et al 1999). The social benefit of this approach is 
particularly important in the context of a highly politicised environment, where more than 
40% of the rural population are unemployed80, and the existence of pockets of extreme 
poverty render competition for Zibambele contracts severe, with more than ten qualified 
candidates often competing for each contract available. In the light of these issues, any 
77 See KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport application to the Impumelelo Innovation Award Programme, 
2000. 
78 The inclusion of child headed households in the programme is part of the Department of Transpods 
attempt to respond to the needs of rural households affected by HIV. However, this initiative is still under 
discussion due to the potential negative welfare implications of child labour. 
79 At a Zibambele selection in June 2001 applicants were exclusively male, which illustrates the need for 
ongoing monitoring and facilitation by Department staff in order to ensure that the applicant profile conforms 
to the Zibambele priority categories of female! child headed households, and those experiencing destitution. 
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external imposition of contractor selection could add to community tensions and the 
potential for political 'capture' of the programme. 
Determination of Wage Levels 
The objective of the programme is not to ensure that participating households do not fall 
below the poverty level, but to make a contribution towards reducing the poverty gap. 
Contractor monthly wage levels were initially set at the individual poverty line of R250 
(2000 prices)81. However the wage has been revised to R334, which is calculated on the 
basis of a pro-rata percentage of the monthly household poverty level (R980), based on 
eight days work per month82, which is equivalent to an hourly rate of R5.57. This 
increase was introduced in late 2001, and the revised figure has been used as the basis for 
calculations in this report. It should be noted that this figure has not been calculated on 
the basis of household need, or on the basis of enabling a household to achieve certain 
minimum 'functionings or capabilities' (Sen 1999)83. Further research is required to 
identifY the optimal level of remuneration in terms of welfare need, consistency with the 
level of transfers under other provincial and national welfare and public works schemes, 
and impact on self-targeting (see below). On the basis of anecdotal evidence and 
informal discussion with contractors, the rate of remuneration is sufficient to enable 
significant improvements within participating households, primarily in terms of 
improving food security by enabling participants to purchase rather than beg for basic 
staples, and also covering the payment of school fees. However, again, formal survey 
work is required to confirm the anticipated impact of the transfer in terms of improved 
household welfare. 
81 Manual for the Implementation of the Zibambele Road Maintenance System, Second Draft, KwaZulu Natal 
Department ofTransport,)uly 2001. The figures are taken from the Department of Constitutional 
Development Baseline for Detennining Basic Services and Institutional Capacity Building. 
82 This is calculated as a pro-rata payment of the household poverty level at 2001 prices; 60hours/176 hours x 
R980 R334. 
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The wage levels are maintained in line with the industry standard for unskilled labour 
(R6.38)84 and are set marginally below the contract rate for the emerging contractors, in 
order to provide an incentive to progress from Zibambele to emerging contractor work 
(see discussion regarding the feasibility of this progression below). Maintaining wage 
levels below the industry standard for unskilled labour is consistent with the concern not 
to distort the construction industry market wage structure. However, the international 
literature suggests that in order to have an effective targeting function, the comparator 
wage for a public works programme should be the prevailing market wage rate for 
unskilled labour, rather than the construction industry norm (Subbarao1997). The 
median monthly wage in rural KwaZulu Natal is R563, and for elementary labour it is 
R433 85. The Zibambele wage of R334 conforms approximately to the 25th percentile 
income in both groups. Given the high level of unemployment, and the fact that the 
Zibambele wage is paid on the basis of only 8 days labour per month, the Zibambele 
wage may be attractive to those who are not the poorest, and hence wage alone is 
unlikely to be an adequate targeting mechanism. This could be problematic in the light of 
the programme's targets of 'the destitute and unemployable', and renders the community 
selection process particularly important. Whether there is a problem of leakage to the 
non-destitute can only be ascertained through ongoing survey analysis. 
Payment Mechanisms 
Zibambele contractors are paid through an electronic transfer system, which is used by 
provincial government for all employees. This system was introduced to reduce 
corruption and the personal security risks attendant on cash payments, and since only 
limited cash transactions are permitted at super-regional or district level, it is the only 
option for remunerating contractors. 
84 KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport Memo, March 2002 
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In order to be paid under the electronic transfer system however a contractor must have a 
bank account, which is not the case for the majority of Zibambele contractors, and in 
order to open a bank account a contractor must have formal ID documentation, which 
again many do not have. Hence Departmental staff assist the contractors with the 
formalities required to get ID, and to open a bank account, support which is essential 
given the limited literacy and numeracy of the majority of the contractors. The 
Department makes a small loan to cover the expenses involved in getting the necessary 
documentation, (photographs, transport costs etc), which is repaid in installments over the 
following months. Holding an ID card also has wider benefits for contractors, enabling 
them to access state welfare transfers for which they may be eligible, and to vote in 
provincial and national elections. 
Under the electronic transfer system bank charges are an area of concern. In addition to 
an initial fee for opening the account, some banks make charges when funds are 
withdrawn using an ATM, levy standing charges, and close accounts with zero balances, 
disrupting transfer payments86. Banks vary in their ability to accommodate the needs of 
small-scale users such as the Zibambele contractors, an issue which needs to be addressed 
nationally, through an agreement between the Department of Transport and the banking 
sector. This issue is important in terms of wider social development and job creation 
activity, and some form of social contract whereby banks change their practices to 
support small-scale development projects is necessary in order to address this problem. 
The use of a bank-based payment system necessitates monthly travel to the nearest town 
and the Department estimates that up to 11 % of monthly income may be lost in terms of 
overheads by the workers, due to a combination of bank charges and transportation costs 
to and from the bank87. In addition to the loss of income, the town based payment system 
also implies that expenditure may take place in town rather than being concentrated in the 
immediate vicinity of the contractor, and as a consequence secondary economic benefits 
86 1ms same approach by the banking sector is also problematic in relation to the Emerging Contractor 
programme, due to the high cost of credit and cheques. 











Public Works as a Response to Labour Market Failure. 
Masters in Economics Dissertation, University of Cape Town, July 2002. 
Chapter 5 
may not accrue to the local community. However contractors may derive benefits from 
the bulk purchase of staples, such as mielie meal, in town, which is significantly cheaper 
than the local purchase of smaller quantities. These relative costs and benefits .need to be 
quantified in order to assess the distribution of primary and secondary economic impacts 
of the programme among the contractor, and the local economy. 
Expansion of the Zibambele Programme 
The Department of Transport aims to extend the Zibambele programme to create 
employment for a total of 40,000 participants, and to expand from poverty alleviation 
alone, to the broader challenge of poverty reduction. These two objectives of quantitative 
and qualitative expansion are being addressed through the diversification of Zibambele 
contractor activity, and the introduction of a Zibambele micro-credit initiative 
respectively. 
Extension to District and Provincial Roads 
Increasing the number of contractors to 40,000 poses a challenge given the limited 
absorptive capacity of the KwaZulu Natal rural road network which totals only 
17,000km, and so alternative approaches to absorb the additional labour are being 
identified. The first response of the Department was to reduce the length of road 
maintained by each contractor by 50%, thereby increasing the labour absorptive capacity 
of the rural road network in the province88. However, this initiative will not provide 
sufficient employment opportunities to meet the projected target, and the Department has 
successfully piloted the extension of Zibambele contractor maintenance to district and 
provincial roads89, where technically feasible. The Department has also piloted the use of 
88 The potentially negative impact of this initiative on economic sustainability is discussed in Chapter 6. 
89 Manual for the Implementation of the Zibambele Road Maintenance System, Second Draft, KwaZulu Natal 
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labour intensive road construction techniques and found that this approach is competitive 
in terms of cost and qualiiYO. 
The Ministry of Transport's 'Rural Access' document (2001) recommended that the 
focus on rural roads should be extended to include the whole rural transport 
infrastructure, taking into consideration non-vehicular means of transport. Including 
initiatives such as or path and track maintenance or pontoon construction is an additional 
potential source of opportunities for increased Zibambele activity, which would also 
address rural access and mobility needs, although this is not yet under discussion. 
National Road Maintenance 
Similarly the use Zibambele contractors could be extended to the off-road maintenance 
(drainage, clearance of bushes etc), and construction of national roads which fall under 
the responsibility of SANRA. In this case, a coordinating intermediary between the 
Zibambele contractors and SANRA would be required as SANRA works through lead 
contractors who recruit sub-contractors for given road segments of approximately 40 
kilometers, and for this reason they are not in a position to tender directly with Emerging 
Contractors or Zibambele contractors. A contracting clause favouring consultants who 
make use of Emerging Contractors and Zibambele contractors could be introduced in 
order to address this problem91 . 
90 Interview with M Manicum, Co-coordinator, Development Directorate, KwaZulu Natal Department of 
Transport, July 2001 
91 Since Sfu'\fRA's authority is likely to be extended from its current 7,000 km of national road to 20,000 km to 
include part of the sub-national network (Ross 2001), cooperation between the Department and SANRA to 
promote Zibambele participation in SANRA contracting would be an additional mechanism to promote 
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Diversification of Zibambele Employment 
In addition to extending the range of roads which Zibambele contractors an~ maintaining, 
and the scope of operation to include construction, options for expanding Zibambele 
labour absorption currently under discussion include road beautification schemes, the 
construction of public conveniences, the creation of road-side centres for trade and 
refreshment along roads, and engagement in road safety activity. The economic viability 
and benefits of such projects in terms of returns to investment have not yet been 
appraised in economic terms. 
The basic skills learned by Zibambele contractors could also be applied to investment in 
rural infrastructure more generally, including the construction and maintenance of clinics, 
schools etc. However this would entail operation in spheres outside the remit of the 
Department of Transport, and require the adoption of the approach more widely across 
the Provincial government. 
Zibambele as Entry Level Emerging Contractors 
The option of using a Zibambele contract as the first stage of participation in the 
Emerging Contractors programme was not viable, since Zibambele workers lacked either 
the aspiration or skills to engage in SMME entrepreneurial activities. Limited literacy 
and numeracy are major obstacles to Zibambele contractor participation in the Emerging 
Contractor programme, as are limited technical skills (the level of skills training and 
expertise of a Zibambele contractor is not adequate for the successful completion of a 
level one emerging contractor contract), lack of transportation capacity, lack of 
management/tendering skills, lack of access to capital, and lack of time, given the 
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The implication of this finding is that the Emerging Contractors and the Zibambele 
programmes cater for different segments within the labour market, and that while 
Zibambele offers a poverty alleviating transfer for the 'unemployable', tbe Emerging 
Contractor programme offers poverty reduction opportunities for those with greater levels 
of human and financial capital. 
Micro-Credit 
A micro-credit component is currently being added to the Zibambele programme with the 
objective of promoting saving as a basis for the development of small-scale income 
generation enterprises, in order to move participants beyond poverty alleviation to 
poverty reduction by stimulating informal employment activity, among the 
'unemployable'. This process is based on the micro-credit system developed by the 
South African Chamber of Business, to which the Department makes a monthly 
contribution for each worker, which can be drawn down for individual or group income 
generation initiatives. 
In terms of production for the local market, livestock raising, market gardening, and 
small-scale production initiatives could be incorporated into the Zibambele structure 
through the micro-credit scheme92. Multiple agencies, both state and private, are 
implementing micro-credit programmes in the province and the coordination of initiatives 
is essential in order to ensure the complementarity of outputs, and consistency of 
benefits. 
This initiative is subject to two challenges however, which may limit its impact; 
mV/AIDS, and the depth of poverty in deep rural areas. The negative impact of 
mv I AIDS on the success of micro-credit initiatives in South Africa has been highlighted 
by van de Ruit (2001), who has documented how the prevalence of the illness among a 
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group of savers can lead to increased micro-credit failure rates93 . This issue is of 
particular concern in the KwaZulu Natal context given the high levels ofHIV prevalence, 
and the incorporation of an insurance function into the initiative may be required in 
response to this problem. The second threat arises from the extreme de-capitalisation of 
the deep rural areas where the Zibambele programme is focused. As a consequence the 
success of the programme will be highly dependent on the correct analysis of either local 
consumer markets, or more distant, less constrained markets94 and in the case of the 
latter, effective product development and marketing strategies, as well as the 
conventional skills development aspect of micro-credit programming will be required. 
Integration with other Poverty Alleviation Initiatives 
Despite the national policy of Integrated Development Planning at provincial level, 
coordination between Departments at provincial level is limited. Integration and joint 
planning of basic service provision, such as housing, education, health and transport is 
weak, a problem which applies equally at district level. The recommendations for 
'coordinated nodal and linkage development, as an IDP sub-process' in the Ministry of 
Transport's recent 'Rural Access' document address this problem, but have yet to be 
internalised and implemented at provincial level, and may have little impact unless the 
incentive structure for inter-departmental cooperation is changed at provincial and district 
level. In addition to the Department of Transport, the Departments of Water Affairs, 
Public Works, Social Welfare, and Horne Affairs are all engaged in job creation and/or 
welfare activities, but there are few effective mechanisms for the coordination of poverty 
alleviation or job creation initiatives within the province. 
93 van de Ruit (2001) argues that high levels of AIDS morbidity and mortality undermine the collective 
responsibility concept at the heart of the programme, and hence contribute an increased incidence of defaulting 
and failure in conventional savings groups. 
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In addition to contributing to poorly integrated service delivery more generally, weak 
coordination leads to significant efficiency losses in anti-poverty programming, arising 
from the development of plural structures and the duplication of programme development 
and implementation activity. This could be addressed if shared resources were developed 
such as the creation of cross-departmental community consultation fora, or shared 
procedures for beneficiary selection, targeting, programme development, and monitoring 
and evaluation of impact. Currently each department is addressing these issues 
independently, without common norms, processes, goals or methodologies. In addition to 
the efficiency loss implications of limited coordination, there are also quality implications 
in terms of the consistency, transparency and equity of provincial anti-poverty 
programming. 
An important factor underlying the poor coordination mechanisms at provincial level is 
the system of fiscal federalisation introduced as a consequence of the 1996 constitution, 
which devolved a degree of policy-making and fiscal authority to provinces and the new 
metropolitan councils. The result is competition for resources between line ministries at 
provincial level and hence each department has an incentive to maximise resource 
capture and constituency support, rather than cooperate. A revised incentive structure is 
needed with reference to national transfers for poverty alleviation and job creation, in 
order to alter the pay-offs in this situation, so that cooperation is promoted. 
Conclusion 
The Zibambele programme is a long term, sustainable response to chronic deep rural 
unemployment in KwaZulu Natal. In terms of the Public Works analytical framework 
outlined in chapter 4, the programme conforms to the poverty relief oriented long term 
programming response to chronic unemployment, with targeted beneficiaries, primarily 
microeconomic objectives, and it represents the labour intensification of existing state 
expenditure. The programme is aimed at job creation, poverty alleviation and asset 
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The programme has been developed over a five year period, and now has effective 
management and implementation systems in place centrally and at district level, with the 
potential for expansion both in terms of the amount of labour employed, and the range of 
activities involved, including micro-credit. The programme concept has the potential to 
be replicated in other line ministries and provinces, and offers an example of how public 
works programming may be used as an instrument to absorb a significant quantity of 
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Chapter 6: Zibambele Cost Effectiveness and Impact Assessment 
Having outlined the Zibambele programme in some detail, the cost effectiveness and 
impact of the programme will now be addressed. A tripartite analysis methodology will 
be used to examine the three main components of public works programming; the relative 
co stings and impact of labour and capital intensivity, the cost of the welfare transfer (the 
conventional public works cost-effectiveness perspective), and the poverty alleviation 
impact. These three analyses deal respectively with the three critical issues; i) the cost of 
asset maintenance under a labour intensive scheme, and whether it is comparable to 
capital intensive costings, ii) the cost of each workday created and of making a transfer to 
recipients, and whether this is comparable to other national and international job creation 
initiatives, and iii) the welfare impact of the programme, taking into consideration both 
monetary and multidimensional concepts of poverty (Kanbur 2002). This latter 
perspective, the poverty and welfare impact of public works programming, is frequently 
overlooked in the international literature (for example see Adato et al1999 or Stock & de 
Veen 1996), a critical omission given the explicit poverty focus of most public works 
programming interventions. Examining the programme from these three perspectives 
enables some initial conclusions to be drawn regarding the effectiveness, sustainability 
and impact of the Zibambele approach. 
Departmental Cost Comparison 
The critical question m the public works discourse is whether labour intensive 
programming is cost competitive with conventional capital intensive methods of asset 
creation and maintenance. In the South African context the debate is ongoing, but while 
Adato et al (1999) quote the conventional engineering industry perception that labour 
intensive programming necessarily entails additional cost per unit output, a decade of 
research drawing on South African and Southern African experience by McCutcheon 
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managed, labour intensive maintenance and construction is cost competitive with capital 
intensive programming. The implication of this is that additional jobs can be created 
within a given budget, and that enhanced job creation does not necessarily require 
additional funding. An initial analysis of the Zibambele programme broadly supports this 
conclusion95 . 
Wage Rate Comparison 
Analysis of Department of Transport labour cost data enables cost-comparisons to be 
carried out in terms of wage costs, and for this to be extrapolated into labour cost 
comparisons per kilometer of road maintained. However, given the unavailability of 
disaggregated capital input costs under the conventional road maintenance system at the 
Provincial level, a formal analysis of relative costs, incorporating both labour and capital 
cost is not possible. 
A direct comparison between Zibambele and Departmental staff wage levels illustrates 
the significant difference in terms of per unit cost of Zibambele and Departmental labour, 
see table 8, which indicates that the hourly cost of a Zibambele contractor is R5.5796, 
compared to R24.88 for Departmental road maintenance staff7. 
95 Given the limitations of the data a\'ailable these initial findings can only be taken as indicative. 
% Calculated pro-rata from 2001 Zibambele wage levels 
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Table 8: Labour Cost Comparison: Maintenance Costs Using Departmental Staff and 
Zibambele Contractors 
!Annual Cost of Road Maintenance Staff (salary & benefit package) 
lAnnual Salary* lHourly Rate** 
~7,274 ~4.88 
I 
Fnual Cost of Zibambele Contractor 
:Annual Salary*** lHourly Rate**** 
4,008 ~.57 
* Kwazuiu Natal Department of Transport Pay Scale 
** Calculated on the basis of 4.5 weeks holiday per annum and 40 hours per week 
*** Monthly Zibambele salary x 12 
**** Monthly Zibambele salary 160 hours 
Source: Own calculations .from KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport data 
The cost differential between the two groups of workers is due to the fact that the 
Departmental staff receive higher salaries plus a package of benefits, which include 
medical and housing subsidies, pensions and the thirteenth month bonus, while the 
Zibambele contractors receive only a monthly wage. The provision of a benefit package 
for the Zibambele contractors in line with that offered to Departmental staff, would 
severely compromise the programme in terms of the number of additional jobs created 
per unit of departmental expenditure and would not be consistent with the targeted job 
creation and poverty alleviation objectives of the programme98. 
This shift away from permanent Departmental staff in favour of cheaper contract labour 
is consistent with an international trend towards the 'contracting-out' of state functions, 
whereby the state reduces the range of benefits and obligations to workers in the pursuit 
of increased efficiency. From this perspective the Zibambele programme could be 
criticized for replacing one pool of high-cost workers, salaried Department of Transport 
staff, with a pool of low-cost workers, the Zibambele contractors. However, the 
98 W'hile a full package of benefits is not consistent with the large scale job creation goals of the programme, 
confumation of job security (contract tenure) and the introduction of a pension or savings element through the 
micro-credit component of the programme would assist in promoting the risk benefits accruing to Zibambele 
households through the programme, in terms of guaranteeing regular income. This would enhance the 
consumption smoothing impact of the transfer and reduce the negative impact of economic shocks, which 
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reduction in the Departmental staff is considerably smaller than the increase in Zibambele 
contractors; in Newcastle District for example, the number of Departmental staff has 
been reduced by 22 over the last two years, while the number of Zibambele contractors 
has increased by 340, in line with the primary objective of increasing labour demand by 
promoting labour over capital intensivity, rather than shifting employment from one 
labour segment to another lower cost segment. Hence the introduction of the programme 
represents a change in the composition of the workforce from one segment of the labour 
market to another, shifting from a small number of skilled/semi-skilled jobs, to a large 
number of unskilled jobs. 
This process of increasing labour intensivity was negotiated with the labour unions and 
an agreement reached that Departmental staff would not be retrenched, but would not be 
replaced as they retired or moved on, and their tasks would become increasingly value-
added, focusing on training and monitoring within the Zibambele programme. There is 
also a residual role for Departmental staff using conventional capital intensive 
techniques, as certain tasks continue to require capital intensive inputs as a complement 
to labour intensive activity. 
It is also important to note that while the Zibambele wage rate is substantially below the 
salary of Departmental staff, it is higher than the median wage level for elementary 
labour in KwaZulu Natal on a pro rata basis, in line with the construction industry hourly 
standard wage (see chapter 5), and above the minimum wage, so the programme is not 
contingent on undermining ethical wage levels, or in tension with labour union positions. 
Cost Comparison Per Kilometer 
The relative labour costs of Zibambele and conventional maintenance systems can be 
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While Zibambele contractors cost less than conventional staff on an hourly basis, the 
number of labour hours required per kilometer of road maintenance under the two 
schemes are widely divergent. Under the original Zibambele contract specification the 
labour costs of the Zibambele and the conventional road maintenance approaches per 
kilometer are broadly comparable, see table 9. The labour cost to maintain lkm of gravel 
road for one year was R2708 using conventional capital intensive methods (on the basis 
of two visits per annum), and R3208 if executed by Zibambele contractors (on the basis 
of monthly maintenance). Hence the labour cost per kilometer for Zibambele maintained 
roads was 16% greater than under the conventional approach, the additional cost 
representing the marginal cost of the jobs created. 
Table 9: Cost Com arison of Maintenance er Kilometer er Annum 








Transport* frequency Cost 
160 2 2708 
* Average cost of transportation from/to depot for Departmental Staff is 80km@R2/km 
ibambele Contractors 
orkers Kilometers Day Hours Rate Transport Frequency Cost 
.8* 1 8 7.5 5.57 0 12 3208 
1.54** 1 8 7.5 5.57 0 12 6176 
*On the basis of the original lengths (1.5km flat, lkm slope, taking an average length of 1.25kmJworker) ! 
**On the basis of the revised len s (O.Skm flat, O.5km slo e, taking an avera e len ofO.65kmJworker) 
Source: Own calculations from KwaZulu Natal Department o/Transport data 
An operational change in July 2001 had a major impact on this comparative costing. The 
length of road maintained by each Zibambele contractor was revised downwards from 
1.5km to 0.8km99, and Zibambele maintenance costs per kilometer of road rose 
accordingly, from R3208 to R6176 per annum, see table 9. Consequently the labour 
component of Zibambele maintenance under the revised specification became 
significantly more expensive than conventional maintenance per kilometer. This change 
in the contract specification undermined the labour cost comparability of the Zibambele 
programme. 
99 The reduction is from l.5km to O.Skm on the Bat, and 1.0km to O.Skm on a slope, specified in the Manual 
for the Implementation of the Zibambele Road Maintenance System, Second Draft, KwaZulu Natal 
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This analysis does not take into account the cost of capital inputs in conventional road 
construction techniques, due to the unavailability of this data in a disaggregated format 
within the Departmental BudgetlOO• Hence the costings for both the conventional and the 
Zibambele approach exclude the capital cost component. This omission will 
underestimate the total cost of the capital intensive system relative to the labour intensive 
system, which has a lower capital input, (by definition), and implies that the Zibambele 
programme may be cost comparative or more cost-effective per kilometer than the 
conventional system, once capital costs are included101 . 
In terms of the comparative quality of output under the two approaches, maintenance 
quality is higher under the Zibambele scheme as it is carried out more frequently, and 
hence the outcome is superior in terms of reduced road deteriorationlO2. This is largely 
due to the fact that according to the Departmental plan, Departmental road teams visit 
each kilometer of road twice in a year103, while under the Zibambele system, the road is 
maintained throughout the year. The difference in road maintenance quality is evident 
when traveling along a road which is part Zibambele maintained, and part maintained 
under the conventional system, in terms of overgrown hedges, poor visibility, potholes 
and erosionllandslide. A poorly maintained road will deteriorate more rapidly than an 
adequately maintained one, and cost three to four more times to repair in the medium to 
long term104. An under-maintained road may deteriorate such that it is no longer 
repairable, and reconstruction is required (Ross 2001), so there are long term cost saving 
benefits to investing in improved maintenance. In addition the Department of Transport 
has calculated that adequate maintenance of the provincial rural road network would 
100 The KwaZulu ;,Jatal Department of Transport does not hold data on disaggregated capital input costs for 
their operations, depreciation rates etc, and so any estimates of the capital input cost per kilometer in the 
context of rural road maintenance would be problematic. Further analysis of the Departmental budget is 
required in order to assess these costs. 
101 This assumes that management and overhead costs are comparable in the two programmes, in line with 
infmmation from M Manicum, Zibambele Programme Manager, KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport, 
June 2001. 
102 Interview with van Zd, Senior Road Superintendent, Department of Transport, Estcourt,July 2001 
103 The Departmental plan of two visits per annum per kilometer in some cases represents an ideal, rather than 
actual figure. More detailed data on this is not available from the Department of Transport. 
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result in savings to the wider community of Rl.3 billion each year through a reduction in 
vehicle operating costs105. Hence inasmuch as the labour intensive approach leads to 
enhanced road maintenance per unit of expenditure, investment in Zibambele job creation 
is also a positive investment in maintaining rural infrastructure in the medium to long 
term and also contributes to reduced rural transportation costs. 
Investment in rural roads was given low priority by the Department under the previous 
dispensation, and so in many instances Zibambele maintenance is not replacing 
conventional maintenance on rural roads, but represents a shifting of investment priorities 
to the maintenance of roads which were previously chronically under-maintained. In the 
case of district and provincial roads however, Zibambele maintenance is directly 
replacing conventional capital intensive Departmental approaches. 
Analysis based on labour cost data and an extrapolation of capital costings indicates that 
the Zibambele programme is cost competitive with conventional approaches on the basis 
of the original contract specification. Whether this cost comparison is retained once the 
contract lengths are reduced needs to be appraised, and will be contingent on capital cost 
inputs for the two approaches; there is a risk of undermining the programme's cost 
competitiveness and sustainability if contract distances are reduced while wage levels are 
maintained. If the Zibambele approach becomes more costly than the conventional 
approach under these conditions, programme sustainability then becomes a political, 
rather than an economic question, as there is a marginal cost for the creation of each 
workday created, which exceeds the amount required to meet road maintenance 
commitments. The extent to which the Department of Transport is willing to invest in 
poverty alleviation, in addition to road maintenance will determine the sustainability of 
the programme under these conditions. 
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However, the critical point is that the Zibambele programme illustrates that enhanced 
quality asset maintenance (with the attendant reduction in road deterioration) and 
employment generation may be attained without additional expenditure per kilometer of 
road maintained106, confirming the analyses of McCutcheon 1995 and 2001, Philips et al 
1995 and others that additional employment may be generated by shifting from capital to 
labour intensive techniques without additional demands on the fiscus 
Zibambele Cost Effectiveness as a Job Creation Mechanism 
While the Zibambele programme is a sustainable mechanism for job creation within the 
existing Department of Transport maintenance budget, the critical question is whether the 
approach is cost effective in terms of the cost of the employment created. This may be 
ascertained by considering the cost per job created, and the cost of a unit transfer to 
beneficiaries, and making a comparison to national and international norms. In order to 
achieve this first the programme will be compared to domestic initiatives in South Africa 
and then an international cost effectiveness analysis will be carried out, using a 
framework developed by the World Bank for assessing public works programming 
globally. 
Cost per Job Created 
In the international literature on public works the unit of measurement of success of a 
programme is conventionally workdays created (see Ravallion 1998 and Subbarao 1997), 
rather than the looser term 'jobs created', which is currently employed in much of the 
South African literature (Adato et al 1999, Department of Public Works 2000). Within 
the South African discourse use of the term 'jobs created' makes relative cost 
106 The positive qualitr impacts identified by the Department of Transport were on the basis of the original 
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effectiveness comparisons problematic since the structure of the jobs created is not 
known (short or long term, full or part time etc). Sometimes the terms 'sustainable' and 
'unsustainable' are used but without a common definition, which leads . to further 
analytical problems (see for example the 200112 South African Budget). There is a need 
to create a consistent terminology within the South African public works discourse to 
facilitate public works programme performance analysis, ideally based on the workdays 
created, complemented with common definitions of sustainability and long/short term in 
order to assess the risk benefit impact of the programme. However, in the absence of a 
consistent descriptive framework for public works achievements, some broad 
comparisons are possible, if certain assumptions are accepted. 
Taking the broad index of 'jobs created' and accepting the limitations of this definition, 
the Zibambele programme may be compared to the main engine of national job creation 
during the 1990s, the National Economic Forum (NEF), see table 10 below. 
T bl 10 C JbC f Dt f Z'b bId N f aI E OF a e . omparlson 0 I am eean a IOn conomlc orum 0 rea Ion aa . 
Cost Jobs Cost/job Duration Salary Materials Management & 
(millions created per as 0/. as °/. of supervision as o/e 
of Rand) annum of cost cost of cost 
National 237.7 52,771 4504 9 months 48 41 11 
Economic (average) 
Forum 323.1* 52,771* 6122* 
1992 -
1998107 
Zibambele 41 8000 5119 Permanent 73 4 23 
2001/2 (8 days (includes 
(Actual) per training) 
month) 
Zibambele 62 12000 5139 Permanent 83 6 11 
2002/3 (8 days (includes 
(Budget) per training) 
month) 
. . .. .. * The total NEF costing for the creation of 52,771 Jobs IS actually R323.1 millIon, as an additional R85.4 mIlhon was 
utilised from other sources. This renders the average NEF cost per job substantially greater than under Zibambele. 
However, these additional costs are not included in the sununary costing tables presented by the Ministry of Labour 
(1999). The cost per workday taking this additional source into account is asterisked in the table above. 
Source: Department a/Labour 1999 andMcCord 2001. 
The NEF job creation programme was in operation from 1992 to 1998, and created 
52,771 short term jobs at a cost ofR237.7 million, an average cost ofR4504 per job per 











annum (in 1999 prices)108. In comparison the Zibambele programme has created 10,000 
permanent jobs at an average cost of R5 119 per annum (in 2001 prices), and hence the 
Zibambele programme is a cost-comparable with the NEF norms as a job creation 
mechanism. An important difference between the two schemes however is that 
Zibambele programme employment is permanent, while the average duration of NEF 
employment was only nine months, which would reduce the programme's impact in 
terms oflong term or dynamic poverty reduction109 . 
A comparison with NEF also illustrates a greater labour intensivity in the Zibambele 
programme than the NEF average, in terms of the higher percentage of programme costs 
spent on salaries under the Zibambele programme, 73% and 82% in 200112 and 2002/3 
respectively, compared to 48% in NEF, see figure 5. 
Figure 5: Zibambele Programme Costs 
Compared to NEF 1992-8 
Source: Own calculations from NEF and KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport data 
This implies that there is a greater transfer of resources to participants under the 
Zibambele than the average NEF programme, per unit of programme expenditure. This 
is a function of both management efficiency and also the nature of job creation activity 
initiated; the percentage cost of material inputs in a public works programme plays a key 
role in determining the proportion of programme costs being transferred to labour. The 
low material input costs in the Zibambele programme account for the high proportion of 
programme funds being transferred directly as salary costs. Figure 1 also highlights the 
108 Department of Labour Annual Report, 1999. The basis for the calculation of the cost per job is not given 
in the Annual Report, and so may not be consistent with the Zibambele fIgure. However the order of cost is 
clearly of the same magnitude 
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reduction in Zibambele management costs between 2000/1 and 200112 which is 
consistent with the projections of Phillips et al (1995), outlining the reduction of 
management costs of public works programming over time. 
An additional domestic comparator for the Zibambele programme is the national 
Community Based Public Works Programme implemented by the Independent 
Development Trust on behalf of the Department of Public Works. While cost per 
workday may be accurately calculated for the Zibambele programme, the lack of data 
regarding the structure of the jobs created by the IDT means that cost per workday 
figures must be derived for the IDT programme on the basis of published datallO, and 
assumptions regarding the term of employment created 111. Comparative costings are 
summarised in table 11 below which indicates that the cost per workday created by the 
Zibambele programme (R53.5) is substantially less than the cost of the IDT created 
workday (R120.8). While the IDT data offers only an approximation of cost per 
workday, the magnitude of the differential between the two figures indicates that the cost 
per workday created is substantially lower in the Zibambele programme than the IDT 
programme, and that more 'sustainable' workdays are being created in the Zibambele 
programme than the IDT programme. The implication is that the Zibambele programme 
is more cost effective than the overall IDT programme in terms of the number of jobs 
created per unit of investment. For a more detailed comparison to be made, additional 
data would be required on the IDT programme regarding the structure of employment 
created. 
110 Department of Public Works Annual Report, 1999/2000. 
111 This estimate is based on reconstructing IDT costings based on the assumption that 'sustainable' means full 
time for 12 months. and 'non sustainable' means full time for an average of six months. These assumptions err 
on the side of an overestimation ofihe'number of workdays created, and hence the resultant figure of R120.8 










Public Works as a Response to Labour Market Failure. 
Masters in Economics Dissertation, University of Cape Town, July 2002. 
Chapter 6 
Table 11: Cost comparison between Zibambele Programme and IDT Community Based 
Public Works Pro ram me 
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* Yearly average given job creation is phased during the year 







*** Estimates assuming sustainable means full time for 12 months, and non sustainable means full time for an 
average of six months 
Source: McCord 2001 and Department of Public Works Annual Report 2000 
Analyses by Adato et aI (1999) identified a wide range of costs per workday created in 
one hundred and one public works programmes implemented in the Western Cape, 
ranging from R40 for the Working for Water programme to RI83 for community based 
programmes, R229 for National Public Works pilot programmes and R749 for 
programmes in the transport sector ( 1999 prices), with the percentage of total costs to 
labour of 73%, 24%, 13% and 11% respectively, decreasing as the cost per workday 
increased 112. Since the structure of employment created under the Zibambele programme 
is known, together with the number of workdays and the wage level, the proportion of 
programme cost allocated to wage transfer and management/materials can be calculated 
for comparison with the Western Cape data, see figure 6. In the case of the Zibambele 
programme the wage component represents an increasing proportion of the cost per 
workday, comprising 73% in 200112 and 82% in 2002/3 . 
112 The implication of these findings is that some public works programmes are highly costly and inefficient as 










Figure 6: Zibambele Programme Wage Transfer 
and Cost of Transfer per Workday 
Source: Own calculations from KwaZulu Natal Department o/Transport data 
With costs per workday created of R53 and 73%/82% of total costs going to labour 
(200112,2002/3) the Zibambele programme is highly competitive with the Western Cape 
public works programmes in terms of both the low cost per workday created, and the high 
percentage of total costs going to labour. The Zibambele data for 200112 is shown in 
comparison to the Western Cape data in figure 7 below, illustrating the low cost and high 







Figure 7: Zibambele Compared to Western Cape 
CostlWorkday and Labour Percentage of Total Cost 
-.. 
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Cost per work/day 
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Source: Derivedfrom Adato et at (1999), p 200 
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For the majority of national public works programmes in South Africa however, data 
regarding the structure of employment created, the number of workdays created, and the 
wage level are not available I 13 (see also Department of Public Works, Annual Report 
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2000), and hence the proportion of programme cost allocated to wage transfer and 
management/materials can not be calculated in this way. This renders analysis of the 
performance of public works programmes in terms of cost effectiveness and programme 
comparisons problematic. 
Transfer Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
In order to perform an internationally comparable cost-effectiveness analysis of the 
Zibambele programme an appraisal framework developed at the World Bank and widely 
cited within the public works literature will be adopted (Ravallion 1998). The framework 
calculates the share of government expenditure on public works which benefits the poor, 
or the 'cost -effectiveness ratio', in order to assess the effectiveness of public works 
programming as an instrument for making transfers to the poor in given contexts. The 
cost-effectiveness ratio is calculated by modeling the net gain to poor workers arising 
from a public works scheme, and from this ratio the unit cost of a transfer to the poor is 
derived. This approach does not include an appraisal of the distribution of programme 
benefits, or the welfare impact at household level. These omissions which are mirrored 
in the mainstream international literature will be discussed in the subsequent section. 
The methodology for modeling the cost effectiveness ratio, or share of government's 
outlay which benefits the poor, is outlined below, and can be decomposed into various 
components; 
Labour intensity of public works projects 
The share of all \vages paid in total operating cost, as some participants may not be poor, is W+L, 
(L is leakage to non-poor) over G+C; 
(W+L)/G+C) (i) 
Budget leverage 
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Targeting performance 
Proportion of the wages paid out which goes to poor workers; 
WIW+L (iii) 
Net wage gain 
The share of the gross wage received by the poor which is left after subtracting costs of 
participating, including forgone income; 
NWIW (NW is net wage) (iv) 
The share of net wage gains to total cost 
NW NW W W+L 
-G-+-C=-W-W+L'G+C (v) 
(iv) (iii) (i) 
Indirect benefit 
The indirect benefits to the poor eg, when assets are created in poor neighbourhoods. 
IBINW can be given as the product of three ratios; (vi) Poor people's share of the social benefits 
from the assets created by the project (ratio of indirect benefits to the poor (IB) to the social 
benefits (SB), where the latter are assessed without distributional weights, (vii) the benefit to cost 
ratio for the project, the ratio of SB to G+C, and the inverse of (viii) the share of net wage gains 
to total cost; 
IB = IB,~/ NW 
NW SB G+C G+C 
(vi) (vii) (viii) 
Cost-recovery rate 
(ix) 
This is not applicable as the Zibambele programme is fully funded by the Provincial 
Department of Transport 
Net Gain to Poor Workers 
B = G+C,W+L, W ,NW,(1+ IB) 
G G G+C W+L W NW 
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The data used in the Zibambele appraisal are contained in table 12 below. 
T bl 12 D t U d fi Z'b b I C t Effi f a e : aa se or I am ee os ec lVeness Aal' n lYSIS 
Data I Comment 
Poverty rate in 142.5% Provincial figure, calculated on the basis of Household Subsistence Lines 
country/region (HSLs), derived from 1998 KIDS panel study data (Carter & May 2001) 
Average monthly R254 Provincial figure for the poorest decile in non-urban areas, from Labour 
income in lowest Force Survey 200l lJ4 
decile 
I 
Unemployment rate 57% Provincial figure for the poorest decile in non-urban areas, from Labour 
Force Survey 2001 
Labour intensity of 0.73*/0.82** Calculations based on Zibambele data, see table 10 above, 
workfare projects 
I 
'" 200112 data 
. *'" 2002/3 data 
Cost-recovery rate 1° There is no cost recovery in the Zibambele scheme 
Extent to which ! N/A Data on location of projects is not available. 
projects are 
l targeted to poor i areas 
Construction of the Data 
The main assumptions underlying the application of the Ravallion framework to the 
Zibambele programme are discussed below. 
Leakage to the non-poor is an issue in all transfer interventions. In the absence of socio-
economic data to assess the extent of leakage in the case of Zibambele, a leakage of 25% 
was assumed in the model, in line with the parameters outlined in Ravallion (1998), p14. 
To calculate poor people's share of total benefits an m/SB figure of 0.43, the provincial 
poverty rate, was selected on the basis that no targeting to poor areas took place within 
the programme. 
The benefit cost ratio was assumed to be unity, in line with the assumption that projects 
produce benefits sufficient to cover their costs in Middle Income Countries, such that 
SB/G+C = 1, in line with Ravallion p 13. 
114 Due to the categorical nature of wage data in the LFS, this figure represents the bottom 13%, rather than 
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The net wage ratio (ffW IW) is contingent on the expected net wage gain (NW) to 
workers from introducing the scheme. This is calculated on the basis. that expected 
earnings without a programme are p* (probability of finding extra work) at wage w*, 
while the programme wage is w and the probability of finding work when participating in 
a programme are P, such that; 
NW = (J-P)w - (P* - P) w* 
The net benefits are dependent on the prevailing employment situation and prospects of 
finding formal or informal sector work. 
A sensitivity analysis was carried out, setting the NWIW at 0.57 and 1, which gave 
results of a cost per unit transferred of R1.36 and R1.03 respectively, implying that the 
cost of a RI income gain in terms of government investment will be lower by RO.33, than 
if NW IW is set at unity (in this case it is assumed that income is not foregone in order to 
participate in the Zibambele programme). Engagement in Zibambele labour is unlikely 
to cause workers to forego alternative employment or to reduce participation in informal 
income generating activity due to the low availability of employment opportunities and 
the part time nature of Zibambele work. In the model the unemployment rate among 
participants is set at 57%, on the basis of 200 1 LFS data. 
In the case where no additional employment is available outside the programme, P p* = 
0, no income is forgone to poor workers, and hence NWIW = 1, a situation which 
conforms to the deep rural situation in KwaZulu Natal. Setting NWIW at unity may 
therefore be appropriate for the Zibambele programme. The figures in parenthesis in 
table 6 reflect this assumption, and indicate that in this scenario the relative cost-
effectiveness of the programme is enhanced. 
Cost recovery is zero in the case of Zibambele, as the programme is not funded by any 
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The Zibambele Cost Effectiveness Ratio 
The mam findings from the application of the Ravallion public works appraisal 
framework are set out in table 13 below115, along with comparator data from Middle and 
Lower Income Country public works programmes I 16 







Poverty rate 43% 
Budget Leverage: (G+C)/G 1.0 
Labour Intensity: (W+L)/(G+C) 0.73 
Targeting: W/(W+L) 0.75 
Net wage gain: NW IW 0.57 
Poor people's share of totaJ 0.43 
benefits: lB/SB 
Benefitlcost ratio: SB/(G+C) 1.0 
Current and future gains to the 0.74 














(1) 0.6 0.75 
0.2 0.25 
1.0 0.5 
(1.04) 0.4 0.41 
Co~1of Rt gain by the poor R1.36 . (1{i.03)W·29 .. (R0.96) $2 .. 50$1,5P 
Current earnings gain per R 0.31 (0.55) 0.35 (0.61) 0.20 0.28 
of programme spending: CB/C 
... - . -.. --, " . . ...... .. " . . . -" . . ,,- - _ .. .. . 
~os:tofRl extra current eamingsR3.2t(RUmR2;85 (RL63)$5,OOS3c60 H > 
* Middle and Low Income Country indicative comparators, taken from Ravallion 1998, pI5. 
( ) Indicates cost if probability of finding work outside the programme is zero 
115 See i\ppendices 1-8 for the full Zibambele analyses for each year, including sensitivity analyses varying 
NW!W and current ;uld future benefits. 










The key fmding is that the Zibambele programme is cost-effective compared to 
international norms, with a cost effectiveness ratio of 0.74 (200112), and an associated 
cost of RI.36 for a R 1 gain by the poor in terms of current and future benefits. If current 
benefits alone are considered, the cost of R 1 additional current earnings transferred 
through the programme is R3.21. If employment projections for 2002/3 are met, the 
programme will be increasingly cost-effective, with the cost-effectiveness ratio 
increasing to 0.78, reducing to R1.29 the cost of a Rl increase in the current and future 
benefits for the poor, and R2.85 for a Rl increase in current earnings. These fmdings 
compare favourably with the Middle and Lower income country comparators developed 
by Ravallion, whose ratios were 0.4 and 0.41 respectively, implying unit transfer costs of 
2.5 for current and future gains, see figure 8 below, and 5 and 3.6 respectively for 
additional current earnings. According to the Ravallion analytical framework the 
Zibambele programme is highly cost effective, compared to international comparators, 
with costs at the lower end of the Middle Income Country job creation scale (Subbarao 
1997). 
Figure 8: Cost ofRl Transfer to the Poor 





an s 1 
0.5 
o 
lib Zib ~IC LIC 
200112 200213 
Source: Own calculations/rom Department o/Transport data and Ravalfion (/998) 
In comparison to the Zibambele programme an analysis of public works programming in 
the Western Cape by Adato et al using the same framework revealed substantially higher 
costs for a Rl gain for the poor in all programmes with the exception of the Working for 
Water programme, which was lower, at RO.81. All other programmes fell within a range 
ofR2.27 and R28.82 for each Rl gained by the poor (Adato et al 1999, p21O), compared 
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In terms of both domestic and international comparators, the Zibambele programme is 
extremely cost effective in terms of the unit cost of earnings gains by the· poorl17. The 
high labour intensity of the Zibambele programme is the major factor determining this 
high cost-effectiveness ratio, a characteristic shared with the Working for Water 
programme 118. The labour intensity ratios of the Zibambele programme (0.73 and 0.83 
for 200112 and 200213 respectively) are high compared to those calculated by Adato et al 
for Western Cape public works programmes and are outside the range of values typically 
found in public works programming, (which on average falls between 0.3 to 0.5 
(Subbarao 1997 and Ravallion 1998)). This reflects the low management and material 
programme input costs of the Zibambele programme, compared to the wage component. 
Such high labour intensity is unusual in public works infrastructure maintenance projects, 
and reflects the labour intensity of the Zibambele technical specification. The high labour 
share of the Zibambele programme makes the cost effectiveness of the programme robust 
to changes in a range of parameters included in the model, such as the benefit cost ratio, 
or the net wage gain, and suggests that Zibambele is a highly effective model for 
transferring resources to the poor. 
Cost Effectiveness Conclusion 
The preceding analysis of the Zibambele programme indicates that the programme is cost 
effective in terms of; 
• transferring resources from state to recipient 
• the proportion of programme costs spent on labour 
• the cost of the creation of a day's work 
117 This is true when both current and future gains, and also current earnings gains are considered. 
118 A high labour share in outlays has a major impact on the functioning of the model and can greatly enhance 
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The programme compares favourably with other South African public works initiatives, 
being among the most cost effective in tenns of these three factors. It is also one of the 
largest scale initiatives in terms of workdays created per annum in South Africa, and one 
of the most sustainable. Internationally, the programme compares positively with 
programmes in countries of similar economic status. 
Preliminary data analysis also suggests that the programme is cost comparable with 
conventional capital intensive methods for road maintenance, although additional 
research is needed to implement a fonnal cost comparison of labour intensive and 
conventional capital intensive road maintenance. 
Hence it is possible to conclude that the Zibambele programme is a cost effective public 
works programme which compares positively to other programmes in South Africa and 
internationally, and offers an excellent model for replication in tenns of job creation and 
asset creation. 
Poverty Alleviation and Welfare Impact 
While the cost effectiveness of the programme has been established above, the poverty 
alleviation impact of the programme is less clear. The Ravallion framework is an 
incomplete appraisal mechanism in this respect as it does not address the poverty 
alleviation impact of an intervention focusing instead on the process of the transfer. 
Assessing the welfare impact of employment created is critical to the appraisal of public 
works programming, given the explicit anti·poverty objective of most schemes, including 
Zibambele. Creating employment is only of value in as much as it serves to reduce 
poverty, as 'work does not necessarily guarantee a way out of poverty' (0yen and 
Wilson 1999, p207), and hence an assessment of the impact of the Zibambele programme 
effective as job creation initiatives, since the lower the labour share of total cost, the higher the cost of a unit 
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on the welfare of participants is essential if the success of the programme is to be 
adequately assessed. However, this aspect is often omitted in the literature regarding 
evaluation of public works programming performance and has not been included in the 
monitoring of the Zibambele programme to date. From the data available it is not 
possible to assess either in the short or medium term; 
• the impact of the programme in terms of poverty alleviation and welfare 
• the impact of the programme on the local or provincial economy 
• the effectiveness of targeting to the poor 
In terms of the poverty alleviation impact of a programme, there are two key areas i) the 
poverty alleviation impact in terms of the risk benefits for participants arising from 
income and asset benefits and the resultant welfare improvements, and ii) the economic 
stimulus impact on the local economy of an infusion of wage income and asset creation. 
The omission of these dimensions of public works programming in the prevailing public 
works discourse is problematic, as it separates the impact of the scheme from its 
execution, and ignores the indirect benefits arising from asset creation and economic 
stimulation. 
The risk benefit impact of public works is critical in terms of reducing the vulnerability 
of poor households by guaranteeing regular income over an extended period, thereby 
allowing households to smooth their consumption over time, and withstand economic 
shocks which would otherwise undermine their livelihoods I 19. If the impact of public 
works programming on poverty is to be adequately assessed, then the risk benefit impact 
needs to be included in the appraisal framework. Ravallion acknowledges that the risk 
benefits from workfare programmes can be large, but focuses on their transfer benefits, 
rather than their 'insurance' function in chronic structural unemployment contexts. The 
potential of public works to address the issues emerging in the area of dynamic poverty 
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analysis, in the context of chronic poverty and unemployment has yet to be formally 
recognised in the literature or incorporated into conventional appraisal methodologies. 
This issue is addressed in part by Datt and Ravallion (1994) who present a model to 
examine the poverty impact of public works programming, however their focus is on an 
income based definition of poverty, and time allocation models, rather than a more 
multidimensional approach, addressing the welfare impacts of public works 
interventions. In order to assess the poverty alleviation and welfare impact of the 
Zibambele programme in line with this critique socio-economic data is needed regarding 
Zibambele participants, however, as with most public works programming in South 
Africa. monitoring and evaluation processes are lagging behind programme 
implementation (Adato et al 1999, de Bruyn 2001). The monitoring component of the 
Zibambele programme is currently under development but to date no data is available in 
terms of the programme's poverty alleviation or welfare impact, or the success of its 
targeting, so it is not possible formally to assess this aspect of the programme. 
In order to carry out a poverty impact assessment of the programme, a longitudinal socio-
economic survey is required. In this way the impact of the Zibambele programme can be 
assessed over time, and the welfare situation of the Zibambele contractors can be 
compared to that of non-participants. This survey would also enable the identification of 
the socio-economic status of the participants and hence an appraisal of the effectiveness 
of the Zibambele targeting process. 
Data on participant households is needed which would include household composition, 
including gender, age and employment status, and income data, as well as a control data 
from the wider population in order to ascertain whether the poorest are successfully being 
targeted. In addition labour force participation and the sources of income of Zibambele 
households should be monitored to establish whether participation in the Zibambele 
scheme is correlated with other income generating or subsistence activities. How and 
where Zibambele income is spent is also of critical importance if the impact on the wider 
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In addition to this basic demographic and economic data, which measures the poverty 
impact of the programme in terms of income and expenditure, the dynamic poverty 
impact should also be assessed by examination of participating households' ability to 
manage risk and move out of poverty over time. 
Indicators are also needed to assess the welfare impact of participation in the scheme in 
terms of the health status of household members, and the nutritional and educational 
status of children in the household, in line with the wider definition of poverty, as 
discussed in recent literature (Sen 1987, Kanbur 2002). Informal discussion with 
Zibambele contractors has highlighted the major welfare benefits from scheme 
participation as i) permanent and uninterrupted school attendance for children in the 
household, which had previously been sporadic and dependent on chance surplus 
income 120, and ii) the ability to purchase or to take small scale credit from shops in order 
to purchase staple food, on the basis of guaranteed income at the end of the month, rather 
than being dependent on the generosity of friends and neighbours. Indicators of 
children's participation in education, and child nutrition would give formal evidence of 
welfare gains in these areas. 
Socioeconomic profiling of Zibambele households through ongoing survey work would 
enable the household and community impact of the programme to be modeled 121, to 
complement the cost effectiveness analysis already completed. 
Secondary Benefits 
Secondary benefits arising from the programme also need to be taken into consideration 
if its poverty impact is to be fully assessed, in terms of income and other welfare benefits. 
120 Zibambele contractors reported that participation in government school costs approximately R70 per 
annum, which can be paid in installments, plus the cost of school materials (mterviews with Zibambele 
Contractors by A McCord, June 2001). 
u1A Zibambele survey questionnaire is currently under development in order to enable a formal poverty 
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Lack of data has also prevented an assessment of the secondary benefits of the Zibambele 
programme on i) participating individuals and ii) the local community. Individual 
secondary impacts would include increased work opportunities resulting from 
participation in the Zibambele scheme, or a movement out of chronic poverty through the 
accumulation of assets and human capital. Likewise the secondary economic benefits of 
the programme on the community remain to be formally assessed, in terms of the 
multiplier effects of both the assets created (improved roads) and the transfer of resources 
into deep rural communities. The secondary benefits of an improved road network are 
likely to be substantial, and should explicitly be included in the formal modeling of the 
programme's impact. The implementation of the longitudinal survey and modeling using 
social accounting matrices would enable these impacts of the programme to be assessed. 
A critical secondary benefit of the Zibambele programme which is not included in 
formal economic evaluation frameworks is the promotion of democratic accountability. 
This has been achieved through the establishment of the Rural Roads Transport Fora and 
the participation of the community in investment decisions related to Zibambele road 
prioritisation, and the selection of contractors. This is likely to have positive social and 
political implications, including creating a demand for accountability within other 
Departments, creating opportunities for coordination of Departmental activity at local 
leveL and depoliticising the resource allocation process, which ultimately makes a 
contribution to stability and growth. The timeframe and transmission mechanisms of this 
benefit are too etiolated to be easily incorporated into an economic appraisal format, 
however, these benefits should also be acknowledged when the broader social impact of 
public works is being considered. 
Conclusion 
On the basis of a conventional economic analysis the Zibambele programme offers a 
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transferring resources to participants, and its performance is superior to the majority of 
programmes currently being implemented in South Africa. 
However, from this analysis, it is not possible to confirm whether this cost effective 
programme is meeting its primary objective of assisting the poorest households, or 
having a positive welfare impact on participants, as the conventional analytical approach 
fails to assess the poverty alleviation and asset creation components of the programme in 
terms of household and community level impact. 
In order to address this critical question of impact assessment, further socioeconomic data 
and analysis is required, which must be considered in conjunction with the cost-
effectiveness analysis. 
The research agenda required to complete a cost effectiveness and impact assessment 
analysis of this programme would comprise four key elements; 
• Poverty mapping in order to identify location of programmes in relation to 
poverty concentrations 
• Socioeconomic data analysis from longitudinal survey to examine; targeting, the 
income and welfare impact and secondary impacts from road maintenance. 
• Labour and capital intensive costing analysis, assessing the relative co stings of 
labour and capital intensive road maintenance and construction methods 
• Social Accounting Matrix analysis in order to assess the impact of both cash 
transfers to the poor and asset creation on the local/regional economy 
Only once this further research has been completed can the success of the Zibambele 
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Chapter 7: The Potential Economic and Job Creation Impacts of Public Works 
Programmes. 
The impact of public works schemes is conventionally assessed through the monitoring 
of the number of jobs created within the intemationalliterature122, however this approach 
is limited as it fails to consider the poverty alleviation or transfer consequences of 
programmes, focusing on the means, rather than the ends of the initiative. It may be 
more constructive to assess the potential impact of public works programmes in terms of 
i) the number of workdays created, in combination with ii) the macroeconomic impact of 
these jobs and iii) their micro-economic poverty alleviation impact (as discussed with 
reference to the Zibambele case study in chapter 6). The potential impact of each of 
these three aspects of public works programming will be considered in relation to the 
South African context. 
The Employment Impact of Public Works 
The two main mechanism for promoting public works and hence generating workdays of 
employment in South Africa, which were discussed in chapter four above, are i) 
individual public works projects initiated by line ministries with support from the Poverty 
Allocation, and ii) the labour intensification of state sector activity and contracts with the 
civil engineering sector. The potential of national public works schemes to generate 
employment is contingent on which of these mechanisms is adopted, and the implications 
of each will be discussed below. 
122 The convention in the intemationalliterature is to assess impact by calculating the number of workdays of 
work generated within a given period. This convention is not followed in South Africa, where a looser and less 
consistent terminology, involving 'jobs created' is the norm. The length of time over which the jobs created, 
their full or part time status, and their sustainability in terms of future funding is not normally specified in the 
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Public Works through the Project Approach 
In South Africa individual programmes administered by the Poverty Alleviation 
Allocation, and the Department of Public Works under the National Public Works 
Programme, have tended to have a limited impact in terms of jobs created 123. The 
National Poverty Allocation is not able to supply data on the total number ofpersonJdays 
created under its aegis, due to limited reporting by the implementing line ministries, and 
the NPWP reports the creation of only 1,200 sustainable124 jobs in 200011, at a cost of 
R274 million (Department of Public Works 2001). This low level of employment 
creation is in line with the fmdings of the comprehensive SALDRU study of public works 
programmes in the Western Cape (Adato et al 1999), which highlighted the limited 
impact in terms of number of jobs created, (both sustainable and temporary), skills 
transferred, and poverty alleviation of the majority of programmes investigated. Clearly 
the scope and impact of public works to date in South Africa does not represent a 
significant response to the massive labour demand deficit crisis, or approach the scale of 
national public works schemes implemented elsewhere where governments in low and 
middle income countries have made job creation through public works a priority. This is 
illustrated by comparing the scale of the NPWP programme, which creates of 
approximately three million workdays per annum, with the national job creation 
programme in India which created more than 800 million workdays per year during the 
1990s and programmes in the region in countries as diverse as Botswana, Egypt and 
Ethiopia which have implemented programmes creating between seven and thirty million 
workdays per annum in recent years (World Bank 2002b). 
The Zibambele programme however offers a more positive VIew of the potential 
performance of public works programmes in South Africa. Since its inception in 2000, 
the programme has created a total of 10,000 permanent jobs, and the Department of 
Transport plans to absorb a total of 40,000 within the next five years. South Africa has a 
123 The notable exception to this statement is the Working for Water Programme which created 21,713 jobs in 
2000/1 at a total cost of R300,975 (\Vorking for Water Annual Report, 2000/1). The nature of the jobs is not 
specified in the report 
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total road network of 567,000km, of which 354,000km comprises provincial roads (paved 
and unpaved), and 7,800km national roads, and 145,000km formal and informal urban 
roads. If the Zibambele programme were expanded nationally, and focused solely on the 
maintenance of the 38% of the provincial road network estimated to be in poor condition 
(Ministry of Transport 2002), a maximum of 134,500 jobs could be created, on the basis 
of employing one worker per kilometer, at a cost of R691million per annum125. If the 
programme were implemented more widely on the maintenance of rural access roads, 
provincial roads and national roads, as well as associated beautification initiatives, the 
employment absorption potential would be in excess of 500,000 jobs country-wide. 
However, it is also critical to note that the spending implications underlying these 
potential labour absorption projections do not take into account current fiscal constraints 
on the road maintenance and construction budget, which faces an investment backlog of 
R27billion, with an additional backlog of R13billion in the rural access road sector 
(Ministry of Transport 2002). Hence, the amount of employment generated with current 
spending levels would be less than the maximum possible, and constrained by the level of 
Provincial transport allocations. 
Analysis from the Zibambele programme confirms work by McCutcheon et al that labour 
intensive repair and maintenance can be cost competitive with conventional techniques if 
correctly implemented, (200Ib). In the light of this, shifting current transport sector 
expenditure at provincial and national level to labour intensive methods would create a 
major expansion of employment (creating a conservatively estimated minimum of 
100,000 jobs), with no cost to the fiscus or reduction in quality. However, to reach 
maximum labour absorption potential discussed above, an increased investment in the 
transport sector would be required. Such an investment would have the dual benefit of 
both employment and asset generation; this 'matching' of surplus labour supply with a 
backlog of infrastructural investment for two-fold national benefit underlay the large 
scale public works programmes in the US during the 1930s, and the more recent Swedish 
employment scheme whereby when unemployment reached a trigger level, preplanned 
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infrastructure construction programmes were initiated based on the creation of prioritised 
national assets (Rifkin 1996). This approach would be particularly appropriate for South 
Africa given the severe backlog of transport infrastructure, and its negative .impact on 
rural mobility and poverty (Kingdon and Knight 2001). 
An indicative estimation of the potential scale of public works employment creation in 
South Africa with existing investment levels can be made by calculating the workday 
impact if the R3 77 million spent by the Integrated Development Trust to implement the 
Community Based Public Works Programme for the financial year 2001-2 had been used 
to create jobs using the Zibambele approach. In this case the total amount of workdays 
created would have been over seven million workdays, rather than the estimated three 
million actually created126. This crude estimate suggests that there is great potential 
within existing budget allocations to have a substantially increased impact on job 
creation, and thereby poverty alleviation. 
Public Works through the Labour Intensification of Public Spending 
The second, and far more extensive form of public works job creation is increased labour 
intensivity in the civil engineering sector and throughout the range of line ministries in 
their asset creation and maintenance activities. This approach was outlined in the initial 
objectives of the National Public Works Programme (NEF 1994). This approach has no 
international comparators and is significantly more ambitious than the project or 
sectorally-based initiatives outlined above. Such a programme would be aimed at 
'fundamentally changing the way in which publicly funded infrastructure is built so that 
employment and skills transfer are maximised for the unemployed' (Phillips 1995, p23). 
The labour absorption implications of this approach in terms of the employment 
generated by shifting government expenditure from capital to labour intensive methods, 
have been subject to extensive technical analysis by McCutcheon (for example 2001b). 
126 These figures are crude estimates derived by dividing the total lOT budget by the cost per workday of the 
Zibambele programme. based on estimated data in table 11, and are included only for the purpose of 
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Table 14 gives data from the conveyances and road sub-sectors and illustrates that the use 
of labour intensive techniques can increase employment generated per rand of 
expenditure by 700% and 900% respectively, by increasing both the budget share going 
to labour, and the amount of labour utilised. 
T bl 12 E a e : tGen ti Pt tial fLb It mplmmen era on o en 0 a our n eDSlVe Meth d o s 
Sub Sector % Total construction budget to labour Increase in employment I 
Conventional Capital Labour Intensive • generation using labour I 
Intensive I intensive methods compared to 
capital intensive methods (%) • 
Conveyances 15 50 700 
Roads (high 15 50 900 
standard gravel) 
Source: McCutcheon. 200lb, p281 
Using this data McCutcheon argues that for the annual expenditure of R1S.2 billion 
which the African Development Bank estimates is required for the next decade to meet 
transport infrastructure backlog needs127, 120,000 jobs would be created using 
conventional methods, while if labour intensive methods were adopted, with the same 
level of expenditure and output, 460,000 people could be employed (Crosswell et al 
2001). In terms of current annual expenditure McCutcheon estimates that 'the 
implication for all civil investment would be additional increased opportunities for more 
than 100,000 in an industry currently employing about 60,000' (McCutcheon R, 2001a, 
p277). This estimate applies to the civil engineering sector alone, and if this argument 
were extended to the building sector, which currently employs 230,000 people it is likely 
that shifting to labour intensive techniques would imply the creation of several hundred 
thousand additional jobs. Formal modeling the job creation and economic benefits of the 
labour intensification of the industry is required if the potential impact of this approach to 
job creation is to be adequately assessed. 
The work carried out so far to assess the potential for increasing labour intensivity in the 
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from shifting line ministry activity towards increased labour intensivity. In order to do 
this it would be necessary to analyse the preceding data in conjunction with line ministry 
budgets at both national and provincial level, in terms of the proportion ·of the budget 
which was eligible for labour intensification, and apply the McCutcheon employment 
ratios for each sub-sector of activity to this data. On this basis the potential employment 
gain thereby created could be modeled, and the impact on the macro-economy estimated. 
This is a critical area for further work, as modifying existing work patterns within both 
the government and the civil engineering sector can only be adequately justified if the 
macro-economic employment gains from making these modifications are known. 
Drawing on experience from the transport sector in KwaZulu Natal, a conservative 
estimate of the labour absorption impact of a Governmental wide process of labour 
intensification, with current levels of expenditure, could be in excess of 500,000 jobs. 
The Macroeconomic Impact of Public Works 
The implementation of a large scale national public works programme, or of increasing 
the labour intensivity of state funded civil works, would be likely to have a positive 
impact on South Africa's macro economy and growth path, if the scale of employment 
creation were sufficiently128 large. The main mechanisms through which increased 
demand for unskilled labour would impact on national economic growth would be the 
stimulation of aggregate demand. This is particularly important in the South African 
context given the identification of constrained domestic demand as a key factor 
underlying low levels of investment and poor economic growth (Lewis 2001a). 
Stimulating demand among the poor would shift the composition of demand towards 
labour-absorbing sectors of the economy129, and in this way the stimulus of increased 
127 This infrastructural im'cstrnent backlog comprises; backlog of primary and secondary rural roads 
R7.9million, prevention of deterioration R4.12million, and new road construction road R3.2million (DBSA 
1998). 
128 The scale of programme required to generate a significant macroeconomic impact has not been established 
in the literature. 
129 This argument is made by Samson et al (2002) who argues on the basis of the conswnption coefficients of 
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demand would promote second round labour demand multipliers. Reynolds (1984) has 
suggested that the multiplier effect of expenditure on public works in South Afiica would 
be between 5 and 8, with 25% of the final demand created being for basic food items. 
Given the high rate of under-utilised capacity and surplus labour in the economy, these 
increased consumption demands should be met without the risk of negative inflationary 
pressures. 
An analysis of the macroeconormc impact of large public works schemes is almost 
universally omitted in the international literature regarding the impact analysis of public 
works. The impact of public works on various sectors of the economy has not been 
formally assessed, but could be modeled using a national or provincial model such as the 
Stats SA Social Accounting Matrix. This would enable a national assessment of the net 
economic benefits of investing in public works schemes, and inform the current debate, 
moving it beyond the immediate poverty alleviation and micro-economic impacts to look 
at the possible wider consequences. 
Social and political stability are also likely to be enhanced by increased employment, 
(Louw and Shaw 1997), and inequality reduced, given the close correlation between 
unemployment and inequality in South Afiica discussed in chapter 1. Combined with the 
increase in domestic demand stimulated by the transfers, these factors are likely to make 
South Afiica a more attractive market for both domestic and international investment130 
and hence stimulate macroeconomic growth. This analysis is in line with the arguments 
linking severe inequality with poor rates of economic growth (Alesina and Rodrik 1994) 
and is recognised in the DTI's 'Human Resource Development Strategy for South Afiica' 
(2001), which confirms that ongoing poverty and inequality undermine prospects for 
'increased aggregate demand for goods and service, therefore limiting economic growth' . 
by the poor will increase demand for basic consumer durables and agricultural products, goods which tend to 
be produced domestically, and absorb a greater proportion of labour in their production, compared to goods 
consumed by the rich. 
130 See BusinessMap 2001 for a summary of recent survey findings regarding the role played by insecurity in 
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In addition to the contribution to national growth, public works programmes also have the 
potential to stimulate the local economy in the immediate environs of the programme. 
The extent of the impact would depend on the concentration of transfers in a given area, 
the amount of cash retained in the local area, and the spending patterns of those 
participating in the scheme. Given the limited amount of money circulating in many of 
the poorest areas of the country with the ongoing reduction of wage labour activity, 
particularly in deep rural areas, the injection of funds through public works wage 
transfers could stimulate local markets and informal employment activity. However, in 
order to assess this potential, and the threshold of income required to stimulate local 
economic dynamism, such that public works employment and growth multipliers could 
be estimated, econometric modeling and analysis of the spatial spending patterns of 
participants would be required. This question of modeling the local multiplier effects of 
public works schemes in order to analyse the role they have to play in generating 
secondary labour demand and stimulating local economic activity, has been largely 
ignored in the international literature. This is a critical area for future analysis, if the 
potential grovv'th and anti-poverty impacts accruing from public works interventions are 
to be adequately assessed. 
Microeconomic Impacts 
The impact of public works programmes at micro-economic, or household level is of 
primary importance in terms of the achievement of poverty alleviation objectives, 
particularly in the case of South Africa, where the incidence and depth of poverty is so 
severe. While the process of implementing public works schemes has been widely 
discussed in the international public works literature, their poverty alleviation outcome 
has been largely overlooked, and there is only limited discussion of the microeconomic 
impact of public works transfers in terms of reducing poverty. The focus of the debate is 
the amount of funds transferred, and the cost of transfer, rather than analysis of the direct 
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programmes for whom poverty alleviation is the explicit objectivel3l . There is no norm, 
such as percentage reduction in the poverty gap of programme participants which is used 
as an indicator of impact, and also no norm in terms of assessing the socia-economic 
status of programme participants, both of which render an assessment of the poverty 
impact of public works schemes highly problematic. Despite this omission in the 
international literature, the primary anticipated anti-poverty impacts of public works 
programming at household level in South Africa can be modeled, drawing on research 
from other transfer programmes. 
Recent economic studies have evaluated the impact of income transfers on the welfare of 
poor households in South Africa, (Case 2001, Duflo 1999, Samson 2002), and identified 
positive correlations between receipt of a pension and household health status and school 
participation 132. While the pension represents a monthly transfer of R602133 which is 
substantially higher than the typical part time public works transfer134, it is comparable to 
full time public works wages, and illustrative of the general welfare impact and 
consumption shifts engendered by a regular household income transfer. 
Drawing on recent South African survey data135, Case (2001) illustrates the positive 
health impact of the pension, arguing that a transfer is correlated with improved adult 
health, measured by self-reported health status, and also a reduction in malnutrition, as 
indicated by stunting, among children in transfer receiving households136. This 
relationship between transfer receipt and a reduction in child malnutrition has been found 
to be particularly strong where the pension recipient is female, and almost negligible 
where the recipient is male (Duflo 1999), a finding which indicates that the targeting of 
women as participants in public works schemes may be the most effective way of 
131 This criticism holds true in the case of South Africa, and in the mainstream intemationalliterature on public 
works programming. 
132 These effects are strongest in households where pension transfers are pooled, which according to Case 
2001, is the predominant strategy in poor households. 
133 2002 South African pension rate 
134 For example, the Zibambele transfer is R334, for eight days work per month 
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ensuring a transfer is translated into improved household welfare. The pnmary 
mechanisms by which these positive changes are achieved are identified by Case as 
improved nutrition, improved sanitation, and the reduction of psychosocial stress 
associated with extreme poverty. 
In the area of education, there is a significant correlation between receipt of pension 
transfers and school participation, with the effect being particularly strong among the 
poorer quintiles (Samson 2002). The implication of these findings is that a transfer to 
poor households is likely to enhance school participation by reducing financial barriers to 
participation, and also by reducing the opportunity cost of children's participation, by 
enabling families to forgo a child's contribution to the household economy. 
Interviews with Zibambele workers have confirmed that the receipt of a regular income 
from public works schemes is likely to have a major impact at the microeconomic level, 
in terms of the welfare of participating poor households, particularly in the areas of 
nutrition and education (McCord 2001). However, in order to assess the poverty 
alleviation impact empirically, panel survey data is required which examines the socio-
economic status of participants over time, and their dynamic poverty profile, in line with 
the dynamic poverty analyses of Liebbrandt and Woolard 2001 137. There is a need for 
systematic survey work to assess the poverty impact of public works in South Africa in 
order to address this question, as only in this way can the impact of public works 
transfers on both short term poverty alleviation and longer term household mobility can 
be assessed, and the real value of the intervention calculated. 
While the poverty alleviation benefit of public works programming has not been subject 
to formal assessment, the research of Case and Samson indicates that a sustained transfer 
to poor households does have a positive impact on welfare, particularly health and 
education. These positive impacts are likely to be spread more widely than the 
136 Stunting is indicated by height-for-age measurements, and is the most income-sensitive measure of 
malnutrition. Given the pension transfer has been universal since January 1994 it is possible to examine the 
long term nutritional impacts on children in recipient households in this way. 
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immediate individual recipient or household which receives the transfer, due to the fact 
that 'the working poor provide the primary social safety net for the ultra poor', in the 
absence of a fonnal state support structure, (Samson et al 2002, p22). Currently the 
impact of the South Afiican social safety net is negligible on the poorest households 
which lack pension-eligible members138, and in the absence of an expanded social safety 
net to support poor households, the role of complementary initiatives, such as public 
works, to effect transfers to the poorest becomes all the more critical. 
In addition to the direct welfare effects of a transfer, there are critical indirect benefits 
arising from reducing poverty and inequality, in tenns of both domestic and broader 
social instability. Louw and Shaw (1997) argue that research conducted in townships 
around Durban confinns the link between violence and poverty in South Afiica, and 
hence inasmuch as transfers reduce inequality and poverty they contribute to reduced 
social instability 139. Hence public works transfers promote not only immediate economic 
welfare, performing a social safety net function, but also domestic and social stability, 
with its attendant social, political and economic benefits. These linkages were recognised 
by Subbarao et al (1997), who argued that 'the foregone cost of not accounting for the 
poor may compromise economic growth in the long-run. In order to survive, the poor 
may ... resort to criminal or marginalised activities ... Moreover, denying the poor access 
to economic and educational opportunities accentuates inequality an outcome likely to 
retard economic growth.' In line with this analysis the World Bank explicitly endorses 
the role of public works as an instrument to promote social (and political) stability, 
particularly during periods of high unemployment during macroeconomic restructuring 
and liberalisation, such as that currently experienced by South Afiica (Mangum, Mangum 
and Bowen 1992)140. 
138 Samson et al (2002) argue that 81 % of adults and 76% of children live in households with no pensioners, 
and that most of the poor live in households which receive no transfer from the state. Samson et al also 
discuss the impact of the pension and the child allowance on reducing the poverty gap in more detail in this 
paper. 
139 Samson estimates that the pension transfer reduces the poverty gap for recipient households by between 46 
and 62% (Samson 2002). 
140 It is interesting to note that despite its identification of public works as a core tool for promoting welfare 
and reducing social and political instability (Mangum et al 1992) the World Bank has not promoted either 
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Conclusion 
Public works programming can play a major role in job creation, as well as having 
significant micro and macroeconomic benefits, through both immediate and secondary 
impacts, and at the same time entailing the creation and maintenance of assets, redressing 
the inequitable distribution of assets under the previous dispensation. The potential 
impact of public works programming in South Africa could be significant in terms of 
reducing poverty and stimulating growth, if existing budgets for infrastructure creation 
and maintenance were shifted to increasingly labour intensive practice, and existing 
public works allocations were spent more effectively. 
Such programmes have been implemented on a large scale throughout the developing 
world, in both middle and low income countries, and have been endorsed by the World 
Bank as an appropriate strategy to compensate for the contractionary labour market 
impact of adjustment, which is currently exacerbating the South African situation. 
Given the continuing failure of the market to absorb unskilled labour, the secular rise in 
unemployment since the 1970s, and the structural changes occurring within the South 
African economy, the unemployment situation will continue to deteriorate in the coming 
years. The resulting unemployment is skewed towards the rural unskilled poor, who are 
increasingly excluded trom the economy, and a radical and extensive response is urgently 
required to address this problem. 
Public works programming offers a pragmatic response to this economic, political and 
ultimately moral problem, and the Zibambele programme illustrates that it is possible to 
implement such a programme within the current South African context, despite fiscal and 
capacity constraints. The challenge now is to extend the operation of large scale public 
works programming nationally, in order to redress the gross inequalities between those 
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Cost-Effectiveness Ratio - Share of government's outlay which benefits the poor, Zibambele 2001/2 
Current and future gains, NW fW = 0.57 
W+L 29,414,000.00 T otaJ wage bill 
L 7,353,500.00 25% estimated leakage to the non poor 
W 22,060,500.00 Wage received by the poor 
G 40,369,730.00 Government spending 
C 0.00 Other sources of funding 
p 0.43 Probability of finding work when participating in programme 
p* 0.43 Probability offinding work. without a programme 
w* 254.00 Average monthly wage in lowest decile 
w 306.00 Monthly Zibambele wage 
IB/SB 0.43 Poverty rate - assuming no targeting to poor areas 
Labour intensity of workfare projects 
The share of all wages paid ill total operating cost, as some participants may not be poor, is W ... L (leakage to non-poor), over G; 
(W + L)/(G C) (ii) 0.73 
Financial benefit-cost -ratio 
The cost effectiveness ratio is the share of government's outlay which benefits the poor, and can be decomposed 
into various components: 
Budget leverage; 
Total budget is G (central and local government spending) + C (private co-financing); 
G+C (ii) 40,369.730.00 
Targeting performance 
Proportion of the wages paid out which goes to poor workers; 
W/W+L (iii) 
Net wage 
Expected net wage CN\\,) to workers from introducing the scheme is; 
(l-P)W - (P' • P) W* 




The share of the gross \\ag~ rccei\ed by the poor after subtracting costs of participating, including forgone income; 
NW/W (NW is net wag~) (v) 0.57 
IB are indirect benefits to the poor. such as when assets are created in poor neighbourhoods; 
IBINW (vi) 
IB IB SB YIF 
--=---~i 
NW SB'G+C G+C 1.36 
NW/G+C 
Net gain to poor workers: 
B = G+~~ W+L 1/'\11' 1+-Il3~) 
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Appendix 2 
Cost-Effectiveness Ratio - Share of government's outlay which benefits the poor, Zibambele 2001/2 






















Total wage bill 
25% estimated leakage to the non poor 
Wage received by the poor 
Government spending 
Other sources offunding 
Probability of finding work when participating in programme 
Probability of finding work without a programme 
Average monthly wage in lowest decile 
Monthly Zibambele wage 
Poverty rate - assuming no targeting to poor areas 
The share of all wages paid in total operating cost, as some participants may not be poor, is W + L (leakage to non-poor), over G; 
(W + L)/(G + C) (ii) 0.73 
Financial benefit-cost-ratio 
The cost effectiveness ratio is the share of government's outlay which benefits the poor, and can be decomposed 
into various components; 
Budget leverage; 
Total budget is G (central and local government spending) + C (private co-fmancing); 
G+C (ii) 40,369,730.00 
Targeting performance 
Proportion of the wages paid out which goes to poor workers; 
WIW+L (iii) 0.75 
Net wage 
Expected net wage (NW) to workers from introducing the scheme is; 
(l-P)W - (p* - P) W* (iv) 174.42 
Net wage gain 
The share of the gross wage received by the poor after subtracting costs of participating, including forgone income; 
NW/W (NW is net wage) (v) 1.00 
m are indirect benefits to the poor, such as when assets are created in poor neighbourhoods; 
miNW (vi) 
IB _ IB SB I NW 
NW - SB'G+C G+C 
NW/G+C 
Net gain to poorworkeJ'S; 
B G+C W+L W NW +~) 
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Appendix 3 
Cost-Effectiveness Ratio - Sbare of government's outlay which benefits the poor, Zibambele 2001/2 
Current gains, NWIW=O.57 
W+L 29,414,000.00 Total wage bill 
L 7,353,500.00 25% estimated leakage to the non poor 
W 22,060,500.00 Wage received by the poor 
G 40,369,730.00 Government spending 
C 0.00 Other sources offunding 
p 0.43 Probability of finding work. when participating in programme 
p. 0.43 Probability of finding work. without a programme 
w" 254.00 Average mouthly wage in lowest decile 
w 306.00 Monthly Zibambele wage 
IBISB 0.43 Poverty rate - assuming no targeting to poor areas 
Labour intensity of workfare projects 
The share of all wages paid in total operating cost., as some participants may not be poor, is W + L (leakage to non-poor), over G, 
(W + L)/(G + C) (ii) 0.73 
Financial benefit ..... ost-ratio 
The cost effectiveness ratio is the snare of government's outlay which benefits the poor, and can be decomposed 
into various components; 
Budget leverage; 
Total budget is G (central and local government spending) + C (private co-fmancing); 
G+C eii) 40,369,730.00 
Targeting perfonnance 
Proportion of the wages paid out which goes to poor workers; 
W/w+L (iii) 0.75 
Net wage 
Expected net wage (NW) to workers from introducing the scheme is; 
(I-P)W - (p* - P) W' (iv) 174.42 174.42 
Net wage gain 
The share of the gross wage received by the poor after subtracting costs of participating, including forgone income; 
NW /W (NW is net wage) (v) 0.57 
m are indine,-"! benefits to the poor. such as when assets are created in poor neighbourhoods; 
lBlNW (vi) 
IB IB SB XU' 
-=-.--1--
NW SB G+C G +C 1.36 
NW/G+C 
Net gain to poor workers; 
B G+ C W + L iV NV 
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Appendix 4 
Cost-Effectiveness Ratio - Share of government's outlay which benefits the poor, Zibambele 2001/2 






















Total wage bill 
25% estimated leakage to the non poor 
Wage received by the poor 
Government spending 
Other sources offunding 
Probability offinding work when participating in programme 
Probability offinding work without a programme 
Average monthly wage in lowest decile 
Monthly Zibambele wage 
Poverty rate - assuming no targeting to poor areas 
The share of all wages paid in total operating cost, as some participants may not be poor, is W + L (leakage to non-poor), over G; 
(W + L)/(G + C) (ii) 0.73 
Financial henefit4:ost-ratio 
The cost effectiveness ratio is the share of government's outlay which benefIts the poor, and can be decomposed 
into various components; 
Budget leverage; 
Total budget is G (central and local government spending) + C (private co-financing); 
G+C (ii) 40,369,730.00 
Targeting perfontIarn:e 
Proportion of the wages paid out which goes to poor workers; 
W/w+L (iii) 0.75 
Net wage 
Expected net wage (NW) to workers from introducing the scheme is; 
(l-P)W - (P* - P) w* (iv) 174.42 
Net wage gain 
The share of the gross wage received by the poor after subtracting costs of participating, including forgone income; 
NW/w (NW is net wage) (v) 1.00 
IB are indirect benefIts to the poor, such as when assets are created in poor neighbourhoods; 
mtNW (vi) 
IB =/B.~I NW 
NW SB G+C G+C 0,78 
NW/G+C 
Net gain to poor workers; 
B Gt C W+ L W NV 
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Appendix 5 
Cost-Effectiveness Ratio - Share of government's outlay which benefits the poor, Zibambele 2002/3 






















Total wage bill 
25% estimated leakage to the non poor 
Wage received by the poor 
Government spending 
Other sources offunding 
Probability of finding work. when participating in programme 
Probability offinding work. without a programme 
Average monthly wage in lowest decile 
Monthly Zibambele wage 
Poverty rate • assuming no targeting to poor areas 
The share of all wages paid in total operating cost, as some participants may not be poor, is W + L (leakage to non-poor), over G; 
(W + L)/(G C) (ii) 0.82 
FinanctaI benefit-cost-ratio 
The cost effectiveness ratio is the share of government's outlay which benefits the poor, and can be decomposed 
into various components; 
Budget leverage; 
Total budget is G (central and local government spending) + C (private co-fmancing); 
G+C eli) 58,728,673.00 
Targeting performance 
Proportion of the wages paid out which goes to poor workers; 
WIW+L (iii) 0.75 
Net wage 
Expected net wage (NW) to workers from introducing the scheme is; 
(l-P)W - (P' - P) W' (iv) 190.38 
Net wage gain 
The share of the gross wage rec~ived by the poor after SUbtracting costs of participating, including forgone income; 
NWIW (NW is net wage) (v) 0.57 
m are indirect benefits 10 the poor. such as when assets are created in poor neighbourlIoods; 
mlNw (vi) 
IB _ IB :3B I .\11' 
NW - SB'G+C' G+C 
NW/G+C 
Net gain to poor workers; 
B G+CW+L if VW IB - = -"-, "--- ,---. ---.(1 +-) 
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Appendix 6 
Cost-Effectiveness Ratio - Share of government's outlay which benefits the poor, Zibambele 2002/3 






















Total wage bill 
25% estimated leakage to the non poor 
Wage received by the poor 
Government spending 
Other sources offunding 
Probability offinding work when participating in programme 
Probability offinding work without a programme 
Average monthly wage in lowest decile 
Monthly Zibambele wage 
Poverty rate • assuming no targeting to poor areas 
The share of all wages paid in total operating cost, as some participants may not be poor, is W + L (leakage to non-poor), over G; 
(W + L)!(G + C) (ii) 0.82 
Financial benefit-cost-ratio 
The cost effectiveness ratio is the share of government's outlay which benefits the poor, and can be decomposed 
into various components; 
Budget leverage; 
Total budget is G (central and local government spending) + C (private co-financing); 
G+C (ii) 58,728,673.00 
Targeting perfonnanee 
Proportion of the wages paid out which goes to poor workers; 
WIW+L (iii) 0.75 
Net wage 
Expected net wage (NW) to workers from introducing the scheme is; 
(l-P)W - (p* • P) W* (iv) 190.38 
Net wage gain 
The share of the gross wage received by the poor after subtracting costs of participating, including forgone income; 
NWIW(NWisnetwage) (v) 1.00 
IB are indirect benefits to the poor, such as when assets are created in poor neighbourhoods; 
IBJNW (vi) 
IB =IB.~I NW 
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Appendix 7 
Cost-Effectiveness Ratio - Share of government's outlay which benefits the poor, Zihambele 2002/3 
Current gains, NWIW = 0.57 
W+L 48,153,600.00 T ota1 wage bill 
L 12,038,400.00 25% estimated leakage to the non poor 
W 36,115,200.00 Wage received by the poor 
G 58,728,673.00 Government spending 
C 0.00 Other sources of funding 
p 0.43 Probability of finding work: when participating in programme 
p* 0.43 Probability of finding work: without a programme 
w* 254.00 Average monthly wage in lowest decile 
w 334.00 Monthly Zibambele wage 
IBISB 0.43 Poverty rate - assuming no targeting to poor areas 
Labour intensity of workfare projects 
The share of all wages paid in total operating cost, as some participants may not be poor, is W + L (leakage to non-poor), over G; 
(W + L)/(G + C) (ii) 0.82 
Fmancial benefit-cost-ratio 
The cost effectiveness ratio is the share of government's outlay which benefits the poor, and can be decomposed 
into various components: 
Budget leverage; 
Total budget is G (central and local government spending) + C (private co-fmancing); 
G+C eii) 58,728,673.00 
Targeting perfonnance 
Proportion of the wages paid out which goes to poor workers; 
W/w+L (iii) 0.75 
Net wage 
Expected net wage (NW) to workers from introducing the scheme is; 
(l-P)W (p* - P) W* (iv) 190.38 
Net wage gain 
The share of the gross wage received by the poor after subtracting costs of participating. including forgone income; 
NW /W (NW is net wage) (v) 0.57 
m are indirect benefits to the poor. such as when assets are created in poor neighbourhoods; 
IBINW (vi) 
IB IB SB "Tr -.--1--
NW SB G+C G+C 1.21 
NW/G+C 
Net gain to poor workers: 
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Appendix 8 
Cost-Effectiveness Ratio - Share of government's outlay which benefits the poor, Zibambele 2002/3 






















Total wage bill 
25% estimated leakage to the non poor 
Wage received by the poor 
Government spending 
Other sources of funding 
Probability of finding work when participating in programme 
Probability of finding work without a programme 
Average monthly wage in lowest decile 
Monthly Zibambele wage 
Poverty rate - assuming no targeting to poor areas 
The share of all wages paid in total operating cost, as some participants may not be poor, is W + L (leakage to non-poor), over G; 
(W + L)/(G + C) (ii) 0.82 
Fmandal bene6t-cost-ratio 
The cost effectiveness ratio is the share of government's outlay which benefits the poor, and can be decomposed 
into various components; 
Budget leverage; 
Total budget is G (central and local government spending) + C (private co-fmancing); 
G+C (ii) 58,728,673.00 
Tacgeting perfonnance 
Proportion of the wages paid out which goes to poor workers; 
WfW+L (iii) 0.75 
Net wage 
Expected net wage (NW) to workers from introducing the scheme is; 
(l-P)W (p* P) W* (iv) 190.38 
Net wage gain 
The share of the gruss wage received by the poor after subtracting costs of participating, including forgone income; 
NWfW (NW is net wage) (v) 1.00 
IB are indirect benefits to the poor. such as when assets are created in poor neighbourhoods; 
IBINW (vi) 
IB =IB.~/ NW 
NW SB G+C G+C 0.69 
NW/G+C 
Net gain to poor workers; 

























Zibambele Budget Breakdown and Analysis 200112141 
1 Zibambele Programme Support Structure Budget 
Head Quarters 




Super-Regional Zibambele Managers 
District Road Superintendents 














4 Job Creation Impact (Yearly Average) 
No Jobs Created 8,000 
Total costlday 53.3 
0/0 100 




































141 Based on Zibambele contractor numbers of 6,000 in April 01 rising to 10,000 in April 02, taking a yearly 












Zibambele Budget Breakdown and Analysis 2002/3142 
1 Zibambele Support Structure Budget 200213 
Head Quarters 




Super-Regional Zibambele Managers 
District Road Superintendents 









Technical Support (Dig, load and haul) 
Total 




4 Job Creation Impact (Yearly Average) 
No Jobs Created 
Total cost/day 
0/0 












































142 Based on Zibambele contractor numbers of 10,000 in April 02 rising to 14,000 in April 03, taking a yearly 
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